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Rethinking Swing Voters
Jonathan S. Gould*
In recent decades, swing voters in courts and legislatures have made
many of the United States’ most important decisions of law and policy. It would
be easy to conclude from the recent history of the Supreme Court and Congress
that democracy or majority rule inevitably entails placing many of a society’s
most important decisions in the hands of swing voters. Far from being
inevitable, however, swing voters result from a highly contingent set of
circumstances, both ideological and institutional.
This Article probes these contingencies, describing and evaluating
swing voters and the power they hold. It first explains the conditions under
which swing voters will exist and wield power, including an account of why
swing voters hold greater power than other pivotal voters. Understanding swing
voters requires understanding institutional design and internal procedures:
some arrangements increase swing voter prevalence and power, while others
have the opposite effect. The ways in which rules construct swing voters give
institutional designers and reformers ample tools at their disposal to increase
or decrease the prevalence of swing voters and the extent of their power. But
nearly any judgment about swing voters and the power they exercise necessarily
rests on thorny empirical and normative issues—including the relative
importance of moderation and stability in different institutions, the
performance of swing voters as compared to other voters, and how swing voter
power interacts with principles of majority rule. Swing voters are therefore best
understood not as ends unto themselves, but as windows into broader issues in
democratic theory and institutional design.

*
Assistant Professor of Law, Berkeley Law School. © 2021 Jonathan S. Gould. Thanks to
Eric Beerbohm, Erwin Chemerinsky, Gregory Elinson, Lee Epstein, Daniel Farber, Rebecca
Goldstein, Bert Huang, Tonja Jacobi, Gabriel Karger, Niko Kolodny, Christopher Kutz, Priyanka
Menon, Eric Nelson, David Pozen, Kenneth Shepsle, Richard Tuck, and workshop participants at
Berkeley Law School and in the Harvard University Department of Government for helpful
comments and suggestions. Thanks also to Kevin Bocek, Derek Ha, Oliver Rosenbloom, Oscar
Sarabia Roman, and Daniel Twomey for excellent research and editorial assistance.

85

86

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:1:85

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 87
I.
SWING VOTER BASICS ............................................................ 91
A.
Plotting Voter Preferences .......................................... 91
B.
Defining Swing Voters ............................................... 93
1.
Pivotality ........................................................ 93
2.
Ideological Distance........................................ 94
II.
SWING VOTER POWER ............................................................ 97
A.
Sources of Power ........................................................ 98
B.
Power over Outcomes ................................................. 99
1.
Courts ........................................................... 100
2.
Legislatures .................................................. 102
C.
Power over Agendas ................................................. 104
1.
Courts ........................................................... 104
2.
Legislatures .................................................. 107
D.
One Dimension or Several? ...................................... 109
III.
CONSTRUCTING SWING VOTERS........................................... 112
A.
Swing Voters’ Contingent Existence ........................ 113
1.
Ideology ......................................................... 113
2.
Size ............................................................... 114
B.
Swing Voters’ Contingent Power.............................. 115
1.
Decisionmaking Procedures: Courts ............ 115
2.
Decisionmaking Procedures: Legislatures ... 118
3.
Competing Power Centers ............................ 121
4.
(In)stability ................................................... 123
IV.
EVALUATING SWING VOTER POWER .................................... 125
A.
Decisional Moderation ............................................. 126
B.
Stability ................................................................... 126
C.
Institutional Context ................................................ 128
D.
Swing Voter Performance ........................................ 130
E.
Majority Rule ........................................................... 133
V.
SWING VOTERS IN A POLARIZED AGE ................................... 135
A.
Polarization and Congress....................................... 135
B.
Polarization and the Supreme Court ....................... 137
CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 141

2021]

RETHINKING SWING VOTERS

87

INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, swing voters in courts and legislatures have
made many of the United States’ most important decisions of law and
policy. On the Supreme Court, Justice Anthony Kennedy spent over a
decade as the decisive voter in nearly every major constitutional case,
occupying a role previously held by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor.1 In
Congress, swing legislators have determined everything from the fate
of the Affordable Care Act to the outcomes of major confirmation
battles.2 The Supreme Court and Congress differ in many obvious ways,
but in each institution swing voters have played decisive roles at highstakes moments.
It would be easy to conclude from this recent history that
democracy or majority rule inevitably entails placing many of a society’s
most important decisions in the hands of a swing voter—defined as a
decisionmaking body’s pivotal voter who possesses distinctive power by
dint of the ideological distance between them and their colleagues.3
Swing voters have existed and exercised enormous power in the late
twentieth and early twenty-first century Supreme Court and Senate, as
well as in some subnational U.S. institutions. Far from being inevitable,
however, swing voters result from a highly contingent set of
circumstances—both ideological and institutional.
Swing voters only exist if the views or preferences of a
decisionmaking body’s members are distributed in a highly specific
way. The body must be closely divided: there is no swing voter if a vote
is unanimous or if margins are wide. Nor is there a swing voter if too
many votes are up for grabs, such that there are many different
plausible winning coalitions. The existence of a swing voter depends on
the ideological distribution of a body’s voters.
But swing voters are contingent in a deeper way as well. Swing
voters are constructed by the institutional rules that organize and
govern courts, legislatures, and other decisionmaking bodies.4 Some
rules increase swing voter prevalence and power, while others have the
opposite effect. On a court, swing voter power will vary based on how
the court sets its agenda, how opinions are assigned, and which
opinions are treated as controlling. Similarly, swing voter power in a
legislature depends on the extent to which rules empower party leaders
to discipline their caucuses and allow for amendments, logrolls, or

1.
2.
3.
4.

See infra Sections II.B.1, II.C.1.
See infra Sections II.B.2, II.C.2.
For a formalization and elaboration of this definition, see infra Part I.
See infra Part III.
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earmarks. Reckoning with swing voter power requires grappling with
the rules that govern the institutions where swing voters exist.
Swing voters matter because they hold two sorts of power: power
over outcomes and power over agendas.5 With respect to outcomes, the
fact that a swing voter’s support is necessary for a majority to exist
allows the swing voter to dictate the content of legislation or judicial
doctrine, within certain bounds.6 The agenda-setting power is more
subtle. When the presence of a swing voter is recognized, other actors
orient their actions around that swing voter’s preferences. In courts,
strategic litigants may only bring cases that can garner a swing voter’s
support, and briefs may propose legal theories designed to appeal to a
swing voter. In legislatures, party leaders and interest groups focus
their energies on winning over swing legislators. In these respects, a
swing voter becomes the sun around which others begin to orbit.7
The combination of swing voters’ contingency and their power
opens the door to questions about their appropriate role in
governmental institutions.8 Nearly any judgment about swing voters
and the power they exercise necessarily rests on controversial premises
about how institutions of government should perform. But there are
plausible arguments both in favor of and against swing voters. On one
account, swing voters are an important source of moderation in a
polarized age. Swing voters also hold the promise of stability,
preventing law or policy from oscillating dramatically between left and
right poles. Yet there are also reasons to be concerned about swing voter
power. In courts, swing voters can lead to doctrine that is idiosyncratic
or not grounded in a consistent interpretive theory. In legislatures,
swing voters can undermine party government or put parochial
concerns ahead of the broader public interest.
Regardless of one’s view about swing voters, a close look at the
determinants of swing voter power can inform institutional design. For
those who seek to prop up swing voters, institutional changes can do
just that. Those taking the opposite view can likewise look to
institutional design to make it less likely that swing voters emerge and
to limit their power when they do exist. Swing voters are a function of
design choices—not an inevitable feature of multimember bodies.9
5.
Cf. Peter Bachrach & Morton S. Baratz, Two Faces of Power, 56 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 947,
948 (1962) (“Of course power is exercised when A participates in the making of decisions that affect
B. But power is also exercised when A . . . limit[s] the scope of the political process to public
consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A.”).
6.
See infra Section II.B.
7.
See infra Section II.C.
8.
See infra Part IV.
9.
See infra Part III.
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Swing states in the Electoral College provide an instructive
analogy. Nobody would allege that the Electoral College is an
inescapable requirement of democracy. To the contrary, all recognize
that the Electoral College is a creature of law and, by extension, swing
states are as well. The Electoral College advantages swing states by
shaping candidates’ campaign strategies,10 federal spending,11 and
executive branch policymaking in areas ranging from trade to
environmental regulation.12 The Electoral College’s obvious
contingency invites both criticisms and defenses of the institution.
Swing voters in multimember decisionmaking bodies are just as
much creations of law as are swing states in the Electoral College. The
difference is that the rules constituting the courts and legislatures
where swing voters hold power are often taken for granted, assumed to
be unchangeable, or seen as merely technocratic in character. Seeing
how institutional design impacts the prevalence and power of swing
voters invites us to consider whether and how things might be different.
Now might seem an odd time for a study of swing voter power.
Swing voters are most associated with the Supreme Court, at least in
the popular imagination. After decades in which swing voters charted
the Court’s path, there now exists a solid conservative majority that is
not dependent on a swing voter.13 Part of this Article’s goal is to show
that swing voters are never natural or preordained features of any
institution, including the Supreme Court. As easy as it would be to have
been fooled by the decades in which Justices O’Connor and Kennedy set
the direction of legal doctrine, swing voters need not exist. If the Court
indeed lacks a swing voter in the near future, as seems likely, this
10. See, e.g., David Strömberg, How the Electoral College Influences Campaigns and Policy:
The Probability of Being Florida, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 769 (2008) (finding that Electoral College
swing states command a disproportionate share of candidate visits and campaign spending).
11. See, e.g., DOUGLAS L. KRINER & ANDREW REEVES, THE PARTICULARISTIC PRESIDENT:
EXECUTIVE BRANCH POLITICS AND POLITICAL INEQUALITY 136–38 (2015) (finding that swing states
receive billions of dollars of additional federal grant spending relative to other states and that
federal grant funding to counties in swing states doubles during election years).
12. See, e.g., Xiangjun Ma & John McLaren, A Swing-State Theorem, With Evidence 49 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24425, 2018), https://nber.org/papers/w24425
[https://perma.cc/WF4H-33UJ] (finding, in a study of trade policy, that the executive branch
weighs the welfare of nonswing state residents at only seventy-seven percent of that of swing state
residents); Susan Page, Bush Policies Follow Politics of States Needed in 2004, USA TODAY,
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/politics/2002/06-17-bushstates.htm (last updated June 16,
2002, 11:11 PM ET) [https://perma.cc/E7H5-QTRP] (highlighting President George W. Bush’s
policy decisions addressing swing state priorities in the run-up to the 2004 election).
13. See, e.g., How Amy Coney Barrett Could Shape the Supreme Court for Decades, NPR (Oct.
26, 2020, 5:01 AM ET), https://npr.org/2020/10/26/927743311/how-amy-coney-barrett-could-shapethe-supreme-court-for-decades [https://perma.cc/7XLU-YZB8] (“[W]e’ve never really had a court
like this in my adult lifetime. We have always had a swing vote. We had Justice Powell, followed
by Justice O’Connor, followed by Justice Kennedy. . . . With six—potentially six people in the
[conservative] coalition, we could expect a lot less swing.” (quoting Randy Barnett)).
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Article’s analysis can help us think through the implications of a Court
without a swing voter.
Moreover, extending analysis of swing voters beyond the
Supreme Court can shed light on other institutions. In a divided nation,
the conditions are ripe for swing voters in legislative bodies. Swing
voters have recently existed and exercised power both in the Senate and
in some state legislative chambers.14 In particular, in the past quartercentury, the majority party in the Senate has held control by a one- or
two-vote majority roughly half of the time,15 and these close divides
have allowed swing voters to emerge. The prevalence of swing voters in
legislatures calls for a better understanding of their power.
A brief disclaimer before proceeding: this Article examines swing
voters in decisionmaking bodies with two blocs or two parties, but it
does not address multibloc or multiparty systems. This focus is
appropriate for the contemporary U.S. context, given the polarization
between left and right (typically, Democrats and Republicans) in many
multimember decisionmaking bodies. It does not, however, speak to the
many democracies that feature three or more parties.16 In these
systems, a small party can sometimes be decisive as to whether a policy
is enacted or whether a governing coalition can be formed.17 These
dynamics implicate a different set of descriptive and normative
considerations than do individual swing voters in U.S. institutions, and
are thus beyond this Article’s scope.
The remainder of this Article proceeds in five parts. Part I
defines swing voters. Part II explores the character of swing voter
power. It shows how swing voters hold more power than other pivotal
voters, how swing voter power includes power over both outcomes and
agendas, and how swing voter power operates in both unidimensional
and multidimensional space. Part III shows how institutional design
choices construct swing voters. It focuses on particular rules that shape
the likelihood that swing voters exist and the extent of swing voter
power in both courts and legislatures. The ways in which rules
construct swing voters give institutional designers and reformers tools
to increase or decrease the prevalence of swing voters and the extent of
their power. Part IV discusses the normative stakes of swing voter
power, including its relationship to the values of moderation, stability,
and majority rule. Part V considers the relationship between swing
14. See infra Sections II.B.2, II.C.2 (providing examples).
15. See Party Division, U.S. SENATE, https://senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm (last visited
Dec. 13, 2020) [https://perma.cc/X6J7-ESNU].
16. See generally ALAN WARE, POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEMS (1996) (discussing
various party systems).
17. See, e.g., JENNIFER CYR, THE FATES OF POLITICAL PARTIES 54 (2017) (providing examples).
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voters and polarization, highlighting in particular the ways in
which the contemporary Supreme Court is an outlier relative to
other institutions.
I. SWING VOTER BASICS
What are swing voters? The term is often used more as a
colloquialism than as a term of art. This Article defines a swing voter
as a voter who is pivotal to outcomes in a multimember body and who
exercises power by virtue of the ideological distance between them and
their colleagues.18
A. Plotting Voter Preferences
This definition of a swing voter depends on the premise that
voters’ views can be plotted in what political scientists call onedimensional issue space. Legislators’ positions can be plotted from least
to most sympathetic on issues such as social welfare spending,
environmental regulation, and military intervention. Judges’ views can
be plotted similarly: they may favor more or less federal power, a
broader or narrower reading of the Equal Protection Clause, or greater
or lesser procedural rights for criminal defendants. These spectrums
will often range from the most liberal to most conservative outcomes,19
but in principle they could cover any unidimensional range.
On this approach, each voter’s most preferred outcome can be
plotted as a single point in unidimensional space, often called an ideal
point. Preferences are typically taken to be single-peaked, with voters
preferring outcomes closer to their ideal point over those further
away.20 Figure 1 illustrates this type of preference. Its left panel
pictures a hypothetical legislator’s views about the minimum wage. Her
ideal is a $12/hour minimum wage. Note that because her utility
function is symmetrical, she is indifferent as between an $11/hour and
a $13/hour minimum wage. But she prefers either of those to minimum
wages of either $10/hour or $14/hour, since $10/hour and $14/hour are
further from her ideal point.
18. This definition builds on two concepts in the scholarly literature: Keith Krehbiel’s pivotal
voters, see infra Section I.B.1, and Lee Epstein and Tonja Jacobi’s super-median voters, see infra
Section I.B.2.
19. KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS: A THEORY OF U.S. LAWMAKING 21 (1998) (“It is
convenient and intuitive to think of the policy space as a continuum on which liberal policies are
located on the left, moderate policies are located in the center, and conservative policies are located
on the right.”).
20. See, e.g., id. at 22; Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, Super Medians, 61 STAN. L. REV. 37,
46 (2008).
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The same exercise is possible even when preferences are not
easily expressed in numerical terms. Figure 1’s right panel pictures a
hypothetical judge’s views about an individual rights issue, such as
whether the Second Amendment should protect an individual right to
bear arms. The judge’s ideal point might be a limited right: some
constitutional protection for an individual right to bear arms, but
allowing for some limits on that right (such as laws barring possession
of guns by certain populations or in sensitive places such as schools).21
On each side of that ideal point lie options that the judge prefers less,
with no constitutional protection at the left pole and an absolute right
that allows no regulation whatsoever at the right pole.
FIGURE 1: SINGLE-PEAKED PREFERENCES

For any given issue, all voters in a decisionmaking body can be
plotted together on the same unidimensional left-right axis. This yields
a median voter: a voter whose ideal point is at the median of the
distribution of ideal points of all members of the body, such that equal
numbers of members have ideal points to the median’s left and to the
median’s right.22 Plotting all legislators’ positions on the minimum
wage or all judges’ positions on gun rights would yield a median voter
on each of those issues. Other issues would have median voters of their
own. Scholars often seek to identify a median voter across all issues by
plotting many issues together on a single, unidimensional left-right
axis.23 Others push back on attempts to plot all or many issues in this
21. Cf. infra notes 58–59 and accompanying text (discussing District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570 (2008)).
22. In a body with an odd number of members, one member is the median; in a body with an
even number of members, the median will lie between two members.
23. On Congress, see, for example, NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD
ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES 22 (2006) (“One
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way as an oversimplification of attitudes that in fact vary across
issues.24 This Article’s analysis does not rest on the idea of consistent
ideological alignment across issues. A voter can be the median voter on
some issues even if they are not the median voter on all issues. With
this background in mind, we turn to a definition of swing voters.
B. Defining Swing Voters
1. Pivotality
The first feature of swing voters is that they are pivotal, which
is to say that they are determinative as to an ultimate outcome on a
given issue.25 The identity of the pivotal voter depends on the
institutional rules under which a given body operates. When an
institution operates by majority rule, such as when the Supreme Court
decides a merits case or when the House of Representatives considers a
bill on the floor, the median voter is also the pivotal voter.
An institution’s rules and organization can complicate the
search for the pivotal voter. Congress, for example, has many median
voters. There are median voters on the House and Senate floor, in each
committee, and in each party caucus. Depending on the circumstances,
way of directly measuring the predictive power of the liberal-conservative dimension is to compute
the percentage of votes on which a legislator actually votes for the roll call alternative that is
closest to her on the dimension. This ‘classification’ success exceeds 84 percent across all
congresses since 1789.”); Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, The Unidimensional Congress,
1919–84, at 1 (Glob. Sustainable Inv. All., Working Paper No. 44-84-85, 1985), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3375689 [https://perma.cc/7YS9-XH87] (“A simple
unidimensional spatial model provides a highly accurate description of roll call voting in the
United States Congress. Moreover, the dimension exhibits remarkable temporal stability.”). On
the Supreme Court, see, for example, Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 20, at 45 n.33 (“Nearly all
systematic quantitative work . . . suggests that the issue space is single-dimensional—that is,
despite their individual differences, in the aggregate, Supreme Court cases can be arrayed
meaningfully on a single left-right dimension.”) (citing Bernard Grofman & Timothy J. Brazill,
Identifying the Median Justice on the Supreme Court Through Multidimensional Scaling: Analysis
of “Natural Courts” 1953–1991, 112 PUB. CHOICE 55, 58 (2002)); Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M.
Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme
Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 145 (2002) (“[W]e restrict our attention to the
unidimensional case. This is an assumption made in nearly all statistical analyses of Supreme
Court behavior.”).
24. In the context of the Supreme Court, see, for example, Joshua B. Fischman & Tonja
Jacobi, The Second Dimension of the Supreme Court, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1671 (2016)
(demonstrating that judicial preferences can be plotted on a legalism-pragmatism dimension that
does not track traditional left-right ideological divisions), and Benjamin E. Lauderdale & Tom S.
Clark, The Supreme Court’s Many Median Justices, 106 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 847, 863–64 (2012)
(showing that because “judicial preferences are simultaneously systematic and predictable but also
variable across substantive areas of the law,” those preferences “cannot be succinctly represented
as simple left-right ideology”).
25. See generally KREHBIEL, supra note 19, at 20–48 (developing a theory of lawmaking based
on pivotal voters).
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a different median voter could be pivotal in determining a bill’s content
and whether it ultimately becomes law. The extent to which any given
voter matters to a legislative outcome depends not only on the
distribution of preferences within and between the chambers, but also
on the rules governing the lawmaking process.
A pivotal voter will sometimes not be a median voter at all. When
a body uses a decisionmaking procedure other than simple majority
rule, the pivotal voter will be the voter necessary to achieve whatever
the relevant vote threshold is. Senate rules, for example, require a
three-fifths majority to close debate on most legislation.26 The result is
that in the Senate, the sixtieth senator is often more important than
the median senator in determining legislative outcomes.27 A similar
dynamic holds wherever else a supermajority rule is used.
Supermajority rules govern the adoption of federal and state
constitutional amendments,28 taxing and spending policy in many
states,29 and select functions in some courts30 and multimember
agencies.31 When supermajority rules exist, the pivotal voter will be not
the median voter but rather the one necessary to meet the
supermajority threshold.32
2. Ideological Distance
The second feature of swing voters is ideological distance from
their colleagues. Not all pivotal voters are equally influential. A pivotal
voter’s power depends on the ideological distribution of voters as a
26. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, Rule XXII(2), S. DOC. NO. 113-18, at 15–16 (2013),
https://rules.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/CDOC-113sdoc18.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PAN5-376Q]
[hereinafter SENATE RULES].
27. See KREHBIEL, supra note 19, at 23 (“[Some voters] may have unique pivotal status
due to supermajoritarian procedures, even though these players possess no unique
parliamentary rights.”).
28. See U.S. CONST. art. V; Supermajority Vote Requirements, NAT’L CONF. OF
STATE LEGISLATURES,
https://ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/supermajority-voterequirements.aspx (last visited Oct. 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/MR3M-ELGR].
29. Allison Hiltz & Luke Martel, Supermajority Vote Requirements to Pass the Budget,
NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES: LEGISBRIEF, Jan. 2015, https://ncsl.org/research/fiscalpolicy/supermajority-vote-requirements-to-pass-the-budget635566644.aspx
[https://perma.cc/
H3YG-6PUL].
30. See, e.g., NEB. CONST. art. V, § 3 (requiring a supermajority of five out of seven members
of the Nebraska supreme court to invalidate a state statute as unconstitutional).
31. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5513(c)(3)(A) (requiring a two-thirds vote of the Financial Stability
Oversight Council to set aside a regulation promulgated by the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau).
32. Similarly, the median voter is not the pivotal voter under submajority rules, such as rules
allowing one-fifth of legislators present in the House or Senate to force a roll call vote or rules
allowing four Supreme Court Justices to grant certiorari on a case. Cf. Adrian Vermeule,
Submajority Rules: Forcing Accountability Upon Majorities, 13 J. POL. PHIL. 74, 80–83 (2005).
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whole. Lee Epstein and Tonja Jacobi have identified a subset of
especially powerful pivotal voters: those voters who are most
ideologically distant from their nearest neighbors, again based on ideal
points plotted along a single unidimensional axis.33
The most straightforward element of ideological distance is the
gap between the pivotal voter and their nearest neighbors.34 When this
gap is large, “fewer possibilities exist for the formation of a [winning]
coalition without the” swing voter.35 On the Supreme Court, this means
that the pivotal voter is the only hope for either the four most liberal or
four most conservative Justices to form a majority coalition. When the
ideological distance between the pivotal voter and their neighbors is
smaller, it is possible for winning coalitions to form that do not include
the pivotal voter. (This assumes a degree of multidimensionality in the
issues under consideration, a condition I revisit below.) On the Court,
for example, perhaps the four most liberal Justices could create a
coalition with the sixth most liberal Justice—bypassing the pivotal
voter. This becomes more difficult as the distance between the pivotal
voter and their nearest neighbors grows.
Also relevant is the degree to which the preference distributions
of the pivotal voter and their nearest neighbors overlap.36 The pivotal
voter’s power is at its height when preferences slope so as to minimize
overlap between their preferences and those of their nearest
neighbors.37 Ideological gaps and overlaps are analytically distinct
concepts. But they are related in that a smaller gap makes overlap more
likely, while a larger gap makes overlap less likely.
Figure 2 shows how these features play out in practice. Its two
panels depict two different distributions of preferences in a hypothetical
body with fifteen voters that operates based on majority rule. In the top
panel, no swing voter exists because the preferences of the pivotal voter
33. See Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 20, at 40–41. Epstein and Jacobi describe such voters
as “super medians,” given their focus on the Supreme Court, but the logic of their account holds
even if an institution’s rules result in someone other than the median voter being pivotal
to outcomes.
34. See id. at 43 (describing “power on the Court” as “a function of the relative proximity
between the swing Justice and those nearest to him”). An apparent complication in measuring
distances between ideal points is that most issues do not have natural units of measurement. The
apparent distance between legislators in the minimum wage example, for instance, would change
if the minimum wage were measured in dollars per week rather than dollars per hour. But a linear
transformation of this sort would not change the relative positioning of various voters. In the lower
panel of Figure 2, for example, for the left bloc, the swing voter is twice as close to their ideal point
as are voters in the right bloc, regardless of what units of measurement are used.
35. Id. at 76.
36. See id. at 73.
37. When this overlap is large, it becomes easier to introduce a second dimension that would
allow for the creation of a winning coalition that does not include the median voter. See infra notes
40–42, 98–109 and accompanying text.
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(V8, in bold) lie very close to and heavily overlap with those of their
nearest neighbors to the left (V7) and to the right (V9). In the bottom
panel, by contrast, the pivotal voter is also a swing voter. The reason is
the wide ideological spread between the preferences of the pivotal voter
(V8, in bold) and those of their nearest neighbors (in left and right blocs).
FIGURE 2: MULTIMEMBER BODIES WITH AND WITHOUT A SWING VOTER
Distribution of preferences (no swing voter, median voter and nearest neighbors pictured)
P ref erence
strength

V1

V2

V3

V4

V5

V6

V7

V8

V9

V10

V11

V12

V13

V14

V15

Outcome

Distribution of preferences (swing voter with left and right blocs)
P ref erence
strength

V1

V7

V8

V9

V15

Outcome

A swing voter, in summary, has two qualities: pivotality and
ideological distance from their nearest neighbors. An institution’s
pivotal voter might be its median voter, or it might instead be the
pivotal voter on a relevant committee or one necessary to overcome a
supermajority requirement.
This definition of swing voters differs in several ways from how
the term has been used in some past work. First, swing voters can exist
even without unified left and right blocs. Though Figure 2 provides an
example of a swing voter sitting between two unified blocs, a swing
voter can exist even if the voters to their left or their right are internally
fragmented—what matters is the pivotal voter’s distance from their
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nearest neighbors.38 Second, a swing voter need not swing equally
between left and right. Even if a pivotal voter consistently sides with
either the left or the right, they will still be a swing voter so long as they
are the pivotal voter and there is sufficient ideological distance between
them and their nearest neighbors. Third, to the extent that voter
preferences differ across issues, a voter could be the swing voter on one
issue or set of issues but not on others.39
This analysis is not only definitional. It also sets the stage for
examining the nature of swing voter power. The features that set swing
voters apart from other pivotal voters help explain the character of the
power that swing voters hold. We now turn to that power.
II. SWING VOTER POWER
Swing voters matter because of the power they exercise in
multimember decisionmaking bodies. This Part explores the nature of
swing voter power, first on a conceptual level and then with examples
from courts and legislatures. Swing voters’ power derives in part from
their position relative to other voters on the ideological spectrum. Their
power results in outcomes gravitating toward swing voter preferences,
with swing voters dictating the content of judicial opinions and
legislation. It also causes agendas to reflect swing voter preferences, as
others—from judges and litigants to legislative leadership and interest
groups—act in anticipation of how the swing voter will behave.

38. Many accounts of swing voters—unlike the Epstein and Jacobi account on which I build—
assume unified blocs on the left and right, with a swing voter who sometimes votes with one bloc
and sometimes with the other. See, e.g., Mr. Justice Reed—Swing Man or Not?, 1 STAN. L.
REV. 714, 717–18 (1949) (“Prerequisites to a concentration of power in a single [swing] Justice are
the existence of two equal and counterbalancing blocs plus a middle Justice who is reasonably
susceptible of being attracted to either bloc.”); Janet L. Blasecki, Justice Lewis F. Powell: Swing
Voter or Staunch Conservative?, 52 J. POL. 530, 533 (1990) (describing “the bifurcation of the Court
into two roughly equal ideological blocs as the prerequisite for the existence of a swing vote” and
arguing that “[t]he [J]ustice holding the swing position may occupy either a center position
between the two blocs or be so loosely affiliated with a bloc of four that he is susceptible to
attraction to the opposite bloc in a significant number of cases”); Robert E. Riggs, When Every Vote
Counts: 5–4 Decisions in the United States Supreme Court, 1900–90, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 667, 706
(1993) (“A swing voter on the Court is almost by definition identified with moderate voting, given
the assumption that the swing voter tips the balance by voting sometimes with a liberal and
sometimes with a conservative coalition.”); William B. Schultz & Philip K. Howard, The Myth
of Swing Voting: An Analysis of Voting Patterns on the Supreme Court, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 798, 799
n.3 (1975) (“By ‘swing’ voting we mean that certain Justices do not systematically vote with either
bloc of the Court, but rather align themselves with the ‘right’ bloc in some types of cases and with
the ‘left’ bloc in other kinds of cases.”).
39. See sources cited supra note 24.
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A. Sources of Power
The features that distinguish swing voters from other pivotal
voters also help explain swing voter power. A significant ideological
distance between a swing voter’s preferences and those of their nearest
neighbors typically makes the swing voter the only reasonable path to
a winning coalition, which in turn gives the swing voter their power.
The two panels in Figure 2, above, illustrate the character of
swing voter power. Imagine that a coalition of voters on the ideological
left (V1 through V7) put forward a proposal to move policy leftward in
unidimensional space. The coalition is one vote short of a majority. In
both panels, the most likely prospect for securing a majority is by
securing the vote of the pivotal voter (V8), since the pivotal voter’s
preferences are closer to those of the coalition (V1 through V7) than are
the preferences of any other voters who are not members of the coalition
(V9 through V15). The left coalition can seek to secure the support of the
pivotal voter in either of two ways. First, the coalition can moderate its
proposal, moving the proposal rightward toward the pivotal voter’s
ideal point, such that the pivotal voter prefers the more moderate
version of the proposal to the status quo. Second, the coalition could
offer the pivotal voter something other than a more moderate
proposal—thereby introducing a second dimension to what has thus far
been a unidimensional exercise.40 The coalition could, for example, offer
the pivotal voter a targeted appropriation for his district (in a
legislature) or a majority opinion that takes her preferred
jurisprudential approach (on a court).41 Regardless of which tactic the
coalition uses, in each instance it acts in an attempt to woo the pivotal
voter’s support.
This dynamic works quite differently depending on the
distribution of preferences. A close look at the two panels in Figure 2
shows why the swing voter in the bottom panel has more power than
the pivotal (but not swing) voter in the top panel.
In the top panel, if the pivotal voter, V8, makes demands that
the majority finds unreasonable, the coalition could attempt to
circumvent V8 by securing the vote of V9. The vote of V9 will never be
pivotal in one-dimensional space, since any move to the right sufficient
to secure the support of V9 would also, by definition, be sufficient to
secure the vote of V8. But introducing a second dimension can allow the
coalition to capture the vote of V9. Because V9 holds preferences that
40. See infra Section II.D.
41. For examples of multidimensional decisionmaking of these sorts, see infra notes 98–99
and accompanying text (discussing legislatures), and infra notes 100–109 and accompanying text
(discussing courts).
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are only slightly to the right of those of V8, the coalition might be able
to secure the vote of V9 by making an offer on a different dimension.
Introducing additional dimensions, in other words, makes it possible for
a left coalition in the top panel to create a winning majority made up of
V1 through V7, plus V9—while circumventing V8.
This is less possible in the bottom panel. There, the wide
distance between V8 and their nearest neighbors makes V8 a swing
voter in addition to a pivotal voter. In the bottom panel, if the left
coalition of V1 through V7 wishes to assemble a majority, it has no choice
but to secure the support of V8. The reason is that V9 holds preferences
on the main issue so distant from those of the left coalition that it is
difficult to imagine any offer that the coalition could make that would
be sufficient to induce V9 to support an outcome so far to the left of their
ideal point. This fact gives the swing voter bargaining power: the swing
voter can make demands on the left coalition, which will have no choice
but to capitulate to the swing voter’s demands if it wishes to garner a
majority. In many instances, the swing voter will not even need to make
demands on other voters; bargaining will be unnecessary as other
voters act in anticipation of the swing voter being decisive. The swing
voter holds a monopoly on the coalition’s ability to secure a majority:
just as in an economic monopoly, the buyer (a coalition) has a goal (a
winning coalition) and no choice but to turn to a monopolist (the swing
voter) to achieve that goal.42
B. Power over Outcomes
This account of swing voters’ leverage helps explain the most
obvious aspect of their power: the power to determine outcomes. A
judicial swing voter can determine the holding of a case. A legislative
swing voter can determine the fate of a bill or amendment. Swing voters
may choose to join one bloc or the other, may condition their support on
a bloc moderating its position, or may demand a side payment as a

42. A limit of the swing-voter-as-monopolist analogy is that it does not capture the zero-sum
nature of decisionmaking in multimember bodies. A monopolist can sell to multiple buyers, but
the swing voter can only create one winning coalition. Another analogy from economics—the
auction—captures this zero-sum dynamic. Just as bidders in a standard, ascending-bid auction
compete to purchase whatever is being sold, and the success of one buyer necessarily entails the
failure of all others, so too the presence of one winning coalition means the absence of another.
Like an auctioneer selling something desired by multiple bidders, the swing voter may receive
offers, either express or tacit, from competing blocs attempting to secure their vote.
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condition for their support. Examples of these types of swing voter
influence abound in both courts and legislatures.43
1. Courts
For supreme courts and appellate courts, judicial outcomes
include both the bottom-line result of a given case and the rules and
rationales that the court sets out to guide future decisionmaking. Swing
judges have power over each of these kinds of outcomes.
The most basic feature of a swing judge’s power is the ability to
determine a case’s outcome. In Justice Kennedy’s last five terms on the
Supreme Court, he was in the majority with greater frequency than any
of his colleagues.44 On two occasions during his career he was in the
majority in every single one of a term’s 5–4 cases.45 He was the decisive
vote on divided decisions concerning social issues and civil rights,46
campaign finance and redistricting,47 the death penalty,48 and labor
unions,49 among many other topics.
Judicial swing voters also impact the development of legal
doctrine. On the Supreme Court, swing Justices have determined the
direction of constitutional law by authoring opinions in major cases on
nearly every topic.50 A swing Justice can also shape the direction of the
43. Swing voter power over outcomes is most evident when a decision is made by a one-vote
margin, but swing voters may be decisive even in decisions not made by a one-vote margin (such
as a 6–3 Supreme Court decision or a 53–47 Senate vote). Once the swing voter announces their
decision and thus renders the outcome a fait accompli, other voters may then vote strategically,
knowing that they will not be decisive. Cf. David C. King & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Congressional
Vote Options, 28 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 387, 388–91 (2003) (providing examples of this sort of strategic
voting in Congress).
44. Kedar S. Bhatia, Stat Pack for October Term 2017, Frequency in the Majority,
SCOTUSBLOG 17 (June 29, 2018), https://scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/SB_
frequency_20180629.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6UP-HCBZ].
45. See The Supreme Court, 2013 Term – The Statistics, 128 HARV. L. REV. 401, 407 tbl.I(E)
(2014); The Supreme Court, 2006 Term – The Statistics, 121 HARV. L. REV. 436, 442 tbl.I(E) (2007).
46. See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014) (public prayer); Tex. Dep’t of
Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519 (2015) (Fair Housing Act);
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (same-sex marriage); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct.
2198 (2016) (affirmative action).
47. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014) (campaign finance); Citizens United v.
FEC, 558 U. S. 310 (2010) (campaign finance); Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U.S. 254
(2015) (redistricting).
48. See Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014); Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863 (2015).
49. See Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616 (2014); Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun.
Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
50. Major 5–4 decisions authored by Justice Kennedy during his time as the swing Justice
include Obergefell, 576 U.S. 644; Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs, 576 U.S.
519; Hall, 572 U.S. 701; Town of Greece, 572 U.S. 565; United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744
(2013); Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310; Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Kennedy v.
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008); and Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). Those authored by
Justice O’Connor during her time as the swing Justice include Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507
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law through authoring controlling concurrences, which can be more
important than majority opinions in determining doctrine.51
Controlling opinions authored by swing Justices have determined
doctrine on employment discrimination,52 the role of race in education,53
and the lawfulness of military commissions,54 among other topics.
Even when a swing Justice does not write an opinion, they can
influence the direction of the law through requesting specific changes
to a draft opinion or even expressly conditioning their joining the
majority on those changes being made.55 In Plyler v. Doe,56 Justice
Powell “wanted the case to be about the education of children, not the
equal protection rights of immigrants, and so the decision was.”57
Justice Kennedy similarly conditioned his vote in District of Columbia
v. Heller58 on the conservative bloc’s inclusion of language limiting the
scope of the Second Amendment right at issue.59 To be sure, swing
voters do not unilaterally control opinion content, as the opinion author
and majority party median also play important roles.60 But in some

(2004); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003); and Shaw
v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
51. When no single rationale for a decision commands majority support, courts treat the
opinion resting on the “narrowest grounds” as controlling. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S.
188, 193 (1977); see also infra notes 125–126 (discussing Marks).
52. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 261 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in
the judgment).
53. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 782 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the judgment); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 269 (1978) (Powell, J.).
54. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 636 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
55. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 31–33, 65–76 (1998)
(discussing how bargaining has shaped legal doctrine).
56. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
57. Linda Greenhouse, What Would Justice Powell Do?: The “Alien Children” Case and the
Meaning of Equal Protection, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 29, 47 (2008); see also id. (“Powell extracted
an opinion that, if not unique, has had little generative force.”).
58. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
59. See Adam Liptak, ‘It’s a Long Story’: Justice John Paul Stevens, 98, Is Publishing a
Memoir, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2018), https://nytimes.com/2018/11/26/us/politics/john-paul-stevensmemoir.html [https://perma.cc/E2NA-H23C]. The limiting language provides that the opinion
should not “be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as
schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the
commercial sale of arms.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27.
60. See, e.g., Charles Cameron, Jee-Kwang Park & Deborah Beim, Shaping Supreme Court
Policy Through Appointments: The Impact of a New Justice, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1820, 1838–53 (2009)
(summarizing research and collecting citations on the relative influence over opinion content of
the median Justice on the Court, the median Justice in the majority, and the opinion author);
Nancy Staudt, Barry Friedman & Lee Epstein, On the Role of Ideological Homogeneity in
Generating Consequential Constitutional Decisions, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 361, 370–71 (2008)
(arguing that though “the median Justice holds enormous power over the Court’s judgment, i.e.,
who wins or loses the case,” the median Justice cannot “control every detail of the written opinion,”
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cases, swing voters can exercise powerful influence over the content of
opinions written by others.
The power swing judges hold over outcomes can shape the
behaviors of both public and private actors. The case of racial diversity
in education highlights this type of influence. For nearly a half century,
universities nationwide modeled their approach to race-based
affirmative action on the “Harvard plan” blessed by Justice Powell in
his opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.61 At the
K–12 level, public school systems have closely followed the playbook set
out in Justice Kennedy’s partial concurrence in Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.62 That opinion
struck down two cities’ integration plans, but Justice Kennedy listed
other approaches to achieving racial diversity that he viewed as
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause: “strategic site selection of
new schools; drawing attendance zones with general recognition of the
demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for special
programs; [and] recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion.”63
Taking cues from Justice Kennedy, school districts subsequently used
precisely these strategies to pursue racial integration.64
2. Legislatures
Swing legislators likewise exercise power over outcomes.65 When
a swing legislator exists, they have the power to determine whether a
bill will pass a closely divided chamber. Contestation over the
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) represents a particularly high-stakes
instance of swing legislators’ power over outcomes. Both the ACA’s
passage in 2009 and the failure of repeal efforts in 2017 rested on the
in part because “the median Justice cannot always credibly threaten to change sides and dispose
of the case differently if she does not get her way in terms of the content of the opinion”).
61. 438 U.S. 265, 316–18 (1978) (Powell, J.); see also Sanford Levinson, Diversity, 2 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 573, 578 (2000) (noting that if the Court says “[s]tart talking about diversity—and
downplay any talk about rectification of past social injustice,” then “the [public] conversation
proceeds exactly in that direction”).
62. 551 U.S. 701, 782–98 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
63. See id. at 789.
64. See Erica Frankenberg, Voluntary Integration After Parents Involved: What Does
Research Tell Us About Available Options? 8–14 (Charles Hamilton Houston Inst. for Race & Just.,
Working Paper, Dec. 2007), https://charleshamiltonhouston.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/
Frankenberg-Voluntary-Integration-After-PICS.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8BW-3MZ2] (discussing
school district integration plans adopted in light of Justice Kennedy’s Parents Involved opinion).
65. See KREHBIEL, supra note 19, at 34–38 (modeling the incentives of various actors in the
legislative process and finding three possible outcomes: policy that fully converges to the
preferences of the median voter, policy that partially converges to the preferences of the median
voter, and the status quo).
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decisions of a very small number of senators.66 Each time, the outcome
was determined by a razor-thin margin, with all involved knowing in
advance precisely which senators would be decisive.
Swing legislators can also use their leverage to extract
concessions, often targeted to benefit their constituents. The ACA is
again illustrative. Negotiations around both passage and repeal
featured state-specific money designed to gain the votes of swing
senators. One version of the proposed ACA contained special treatment
for Nebraska—derisively called the “Cornhusker kickback”—designed
to woo Senator Ben Nelson (D-NE).67 Repeal proponents likewise
offered special treatment for Alaska in an attempt to gain the support
of Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-AK).68 In addition, swing voters on
legislative committees, like swing voters on the floor, can extract
funding or other particularized benefits for their constituencies.69 And
similar dynamics hold in state legislatures: a recent swing voter in the
New York State Senate used his status as a swing voter to secure
disproportionate state funding for his district.70
Swing legislators may use their power to pursue goals other than
particularized benefits for their constituencies. Senator John McCain’s
(R-AZ) stated reason for voting against ACA repeal efforts in 2017 was

66. Passage of the ACA required Democrats to gain the support of Senator Joseph Lieberman
(ID-CT) and Senator Ben Nelson (D-NE) in 2009–10, while attempts to repeal the Act in 2017
required Republicans to court Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-AK) and Senator John McCain (R-AZ).
See David M. Herszenhorn & Carl Hulse, Democrats Clinch Deal for Deciding Vote on Health Bill,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2009), https://nytimes.com/2009/12/20/health/policy/20health.html
[https://perma.cc/L2EK-Z52M]; Jessie Hellmann, The Two Senators Who Will Likely Decide Fate
of Obamacare Repeal, HILL (Sept. 20, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/
senate/351465-mccain-and-murkowski-hold-the-key-to-bills-fate [https://perma.cc/5MGF-ERUU].
67. See Steve Jordon, The Story of Nelson and the ‘Cornhusker Kickback,’ ASSOCIATED PRESS
(July 22, 2017), https://apnews.com/article/e0da557d50ac459f990d74d264e7add6 [https://
perma.cc/26S8-3XY8] (describing the inclusion of federal funding for Nebraska’s Medicaid program
in the Senate bill in order to garner Nelson’s vote to overcome a filibuster, but noting that the
funding was absent from the version of the ACA that became law).
68. See Liz Ruskin, ACA Repeal Bill Now Peppered with Alaska Money to Draw Murkowski,
ALASKA PUB. MEDIA (Sept. 25, 2017), https://alaskapublic.org/2017/09/25/aca-repeal-bill-nowpeppered-with-alaska-money-to-draw-murkowski [https://perma.cc/N464-P7NU].
69. See, e.g., Glenn Kessler & Thomas B. Edsall, Senate Democrats Offer Stimulus Plan,
WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2001), https://washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/11/07/senatedemocrats-offer-stimulus-plan/4343e7fc-3ac9-4066-8f95-44ee367f8c4b
[https://perma.cc/9EY3RPKJ] (describing the addition of “agricultural stimulus” in an economic stimulus package as part
of an effort to gain the support of a swing voter on the Senate Finance Committee); see also John
F. Manley, Wilbur D. Mills: A Study in Congressional Influence, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 442, 461
(1969) (“The Chairman’s influence in the Committee is on some issues closely related to his position
as the crucial swing vote between the coalitions that appear most often on Ways and
Means issues.”).
70. See, e.g., Carl Campanile, Simcha Felder’s Swing Vote Has Landed $1.2M for His District,
N.Y. POST (May 9, 2018, 10:23 PM), https://nypost.com/2018/05/09/simcha-felders-swing-vote-haslanded-1-2m-for-his-district [https://perma.cc/8RZJ-G9FT].
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that those efforts did not proceed through traditional Senate procedures
(sometimes called “regular order”), which would have provided for
hearings and the possibility of amendments.71 Other times, swing
voters may seek to influence policy for more idiosyncratic or even
personal reasons. Consider Senator Joseph Lieberman (ID-CT), who
one journalist described as having engaged in a “petulant use of his
power as a swing vote” during the first two years of the Obama
Administration.72 Regardless of what motivates legislative swing voters
and the kinds of demands that they make, the key feature of their power
is that they exercise significant control over legislative outcomes.
C. Power over Agendas
A swing voter’s power to impact a decisionmaking body’s agenda
and the actions of third parties is more subtle than their role in shaping
outcomes, but at times just as consequential. Swing voters typically
have no formal power over a body’s agenda. Yet they can, and
sometimes do, make known to their colleagues that certain outcomes
are or are not acceptable to them, which in turn affects the agenda of
the decisionmaking body as a whole. Even when swing voters do not
proactively state their preferences, the mere presence of a swing voter
can affect agendas. When a swing voter will likely be decisive as to
ultimate outcomes, those who control agendas often make decisions
based on the swing voter’s preferences, real or perceived. Even without
formal agenda power, swing voters may thus have the de facto power to
put certain issues onto the decisionmaking body’s agenda (positive
agenda control) and to prevent the body from taking up other issues
(negative agenda control).73
1. Courts
In the judicial context, the impact of a swing judge on agenda
setting manifests in several different ways. In courts that have control
71. See Hellmann, supra note 66; Russell Berman, The Two Republicans Who Will Likely
Determine Obamacare’s Fate, ATLANTIC (Sept. 19, 2017), https://theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2
017/09/mccain-murkowski-senate-obamacare-repeal/540378 [https://perma.cc/6URD-854G].
72. Alex Koppelman, The Last of the Moderates, NEW YORKER (Aug. 16, 2012),
https://newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-last-of-the-moderates
[https://perma.cc/UM8A7JHT]; see also Ezra Klein, Joe Lieberman: Let’s Not Make a Deal!, WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2009,
7:01 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2009/12/joe_lieberman_lets_not_make_
a.html [https://perma.cc/3B4N-KRW8]. For a satirical but incisive portrayal of the demands that
swing voters are able to make, see Parks and Recreation: Swing Vote (NBC television broadcast
Apr. 25, 2013).
73. Cf. GARY W. COX & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, SETTING THE AGENDA: RESPONSIBLE PARTY
GOVERNMENT IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 20 (2005). Negative agenda control is often

2021]

RETHINKING SWING VOTERS

105

over which cases to hear, judges might look to the swing voter in
deciding whether to take a case. On the Supreme Court, the swing voter
is formally superfluous to the certiorari process, given that the four leftor right-most Justices can grant certiorari without the swing Justice’s
support.74 But as a functional matter, the swing voter is critical. A bloc
of four Justices has little reason to grant certiorari unless they think
they have at least a chance of later securing the swing Justice as a fifth
vote for their preferred outcome or reasoning.75
Litigants also look to judicial swing voters, tailoring their
arguments to their perceptions of swing voter preferences.76 During
Justice Kennedy’s time as the Supreme Court’s swing Justice, one
leading litigator described briefs in a major case as “love letters to
Justice Kennedy,”77 and another quipped that he “would put Justice
Kennedy’s photo on the cover” of his briefs if permitted.78 This strategy
of targeting a swing Justice makes perfect sense, given the need to
garner five votes for a Supreme Court majority.79
Judicial swing voters can also matter long before a case is on the
docket. Litigants may only file a case in the first instance if they believe
hard for outsiders to observe, given the difficulty of identifying proposals that would have been
made, counterfactually, if power was distributed differently within a body.
74. See M. Patrick Yingling, Judicial Conventions: An Examination of the US Supreme
Court’s Rule of Four, 38 U. DUBLIN L.J. 477 (2015). On the Supreme Court’s certiorari process, see
generally H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT (1991); Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of
Certiorari: Jurisprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389
(2004); Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, Setting the Social Agenda: Deciding to
Review High-Profile Cases at the Supreme Court, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 313 (2009).
75. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Incredible Shrinking Docket, TRIAL, Mar. 2007, at 64, 65
(“[I]t might be that four [J]ustices will vote to grant certiorari only when they are reasonably
confident that they will have a fifth vote lined up for an opinion.”); see also, e.g., Liles v. Oregon,
425 U.S. 963, 964 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (“[R]egardless of how
I might vote on the merits after full argument, it would be pointless to grant certiorari in case after
case of this character only to have Miller [v. California] reaffirmed time after time.”); Carter v.
United States, 422 U.S. 1020, 1022 n.* (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting in the denial of certiorari)
(“Although four of us would grant and reverse, the Justices who join this opinion do not insist that
the case be decided on the merits.”).
76. See, e.g., Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 20, at 95–96; Dahlia Lithwick, A High Court of
One: The Role of the “Swing Voter” in the 2002 Term, in A YEAR AT THE SUPREME COURT 13, 20
(Neal Devins & Davison M. Douglas eds., 2004).
77. Robert Barnes, Justices Weigh Courts’ Role in Detainee Cases, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2007,
at A20 (quoting Kathleen Sullivan).
78. Joe Fox, Ann Gerhart & Kevin Schaul, In His Final Term, Justice Kennedy Handed
Conservatives Many Victories, WASH. POST (June 27, 2018, 1:30 PM), https://washingtonpost.com/
politics/courts_law/justice-kennedy-the-pivotal-swing-vote-on-the-supreme-court-announcesretirement/2018/06/27/a40a8c64-5932-11e7-a204-ad706461fa4f_story.html
[https://perma.cc/
T8JM-NW3Y] (quoting Erwin Chemerinsky).
79. Cf. Anthony Lewis, In Memoriam, William J. Brennan, Jr., 111 HARV. L. REV. 29, 32
(1997) (“Justice Brennan used to joke that a critical talent for a Supreme Court Justice was the
ability to count to five.”).
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that a swing voter is likely to move the law in their favored direction.
After a decision by a federal court of appeals, the losing party might
only petition the Supreme Court for certiorari if it believes that it is
likely, or at least plausible, that it will ultimately secure the fifth vote
necessary to prevail on the merits.
A swing Justice may also signal to would-be litigants about what
cases to bring or what legal theories they would be open to. Justice
Kennedy sent such a signal in Vieth v. Jubelirer,80 a 2004 constitutional
challenge to partisan gerrymandering. In Vieth, four Justices would
have found for plaintiffs on their political gerrymandering claim, and
four Justices would have found all political gerrymandering claims
nonjusticiable.81 Justice Kennedy concluded that “[t]he failings of the
many proposed standards for measuring the burden a gerrymander
imposes on representational rights make our intervention [in this case]
improper,” but reserved the right to grant relief if in the future
“workable standards do emerge to measure these burdens.”82 Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence spurred a wave of social science research
seeking to define judicially manageable standards for partisan
gerrymandering,83 as well as new litigation proposing standards that
plaintiffs hoped Justice Kennedy would find “workable.” That litigation
ultimately failed: in the days before his retirement, Justice Kennedy
declined to provide a fifth vote to find any proposed standard of partisan
gerrymandering judicially administrable.84 But Justice Kennedy’s Vieth
concurrence influenced litigation and scholarship around partisan
gerrymandering for over a decade. And it is one example of many: across
areas of law, swing Justices have expressly invited litigants to bring
cases advancing particular legal theories.85
80. 541 U.S. 267, 306–17 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
81. Four Justices signed on to the plurality opinion finding all political gerrymandering cases
nonjusticiable, id. at 270–306 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., O’Connor, J., and Thomas, J.),
while four others each authored or joined dissents, id. at 317–42 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at
342–55 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.); id. at 355–68 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 317 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
83. Leading contributions included Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan
Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831 (2015); Jowei Chen & Jonathan
Rodden, Cutting Through the Thicket: Redistricting Simulations and the Detection of Partisan
Gerrymanders, 14 ELECTION L.J. 331 (2015); Samuel S.-H. Wang, Three Tests for Practical
Evaluation of Partisan Gerrymandering, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1263 (2016); and Wendy K. Tam Cho &
Yan Y. Liu, Toward a Talismanic Redistricting Tool: A Computational Method for Identifying
Extreme Redistricting Plans, 15 ELECTION L.J. 351 (2016).
84. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
85. See, e.g., Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 289–90 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“In a case
that presented the issue, the judiciary may be required, within its proper jurisdiction and
authority, to determine whether workable alternative systems for long-term confinement exist,
and, if so, whether a correctional system should be required to adopt them.”); Direct Mktg. Ass’n
v. Brohl, 575 U.S. 1, 18–19 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[I]t is unwise to delay any longer a
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2. Legislatures
Swing voters can exercise similar control over legislative
agendas. Just as a swing Justice does not have formal power over which
cases the Court hears, a swing legislator similarly has no formal power
over which bills progress through the legislative process. That agendasetting power lies with party leadership, committee chairs, and
subcommittee chairs. Political scientists have shown the potency of
agenda control as a tool that party leaders use to advance their
policy goals.86
Yet swing legislators can still indirectly impact the legislative
agenda. The legislators who hold formal control over the agenda may
put forth some proposals and not others based on the stated or perceived
preferences of swing legislators. Political scientists differ on the degree
to which the agendas reflect the preferences of party leaders, the
majority party median, and the chamber median.87 But the chamber
median—who is sometimes (though not always) a swing voter—exerts
at least some degree of indirect influence over legislative agendas.88
Congressional leaders may advance proposals (bills,
amendments, or nominations) only if they believe that they can garner
a swing legislator’s support. The legislative maneuvering over the ACA
again provides an example. Many Democrats, both in the White House
and in Congress, favored creating a government-run health insurance
reconsideration of the Court’s holding in Quill. A case questionable even when decided, Quill now
harms States to a degree far greater than could have been anticipated. . . . The legal system should
find an appropriate case for this Court to reexamine Quill . . . .” (citation omitted)).
86. See, e.g., Sarah A. Binder, Eric D. Lawrence & Forrest Maltzman, Uncovering the Hidden
Effect of Party, 61 J. POL. 815 (1999); Sean Gailmard & Jeffery A. Jenkins, Negative Agenda
Control in the Senate and House: Fingerprints of Majority Party Power, 69 J. POL. 689 (2007); Molly
C. Jackman, Parties, Median Legislators, and Agenda Setting: How Legislative Institutions Matter,
76 J. POL. 259 (2013); Eric D. Lawrence, Forest Maltzman & Steven S. Smith, Who Wins? Party
Effects in Legislative Voting, 31 LEG. STUD. Q. 33 (2006). See also, generally GARY W. COX &
MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN: PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUSE (1993);
DAVID W. ROHDE, PARTIES AND LEADERS IN THE POSTREFORM HOUSE (1991).
87. See Jackman, supra note 86, at 259–60 (noting that “the presence of majoritarian rules
should mean that the median legislator decides which bills come to a floor vote, in addition to
which bills pass,” but citing sources demonstrating that “[t]his point . . . is contested” in the
political science literature).
88. See, e.g., id. at 271 (“[M]ajoritarian rules [procedures that allow a chamber majority to
circumvent majority-party gatekeeping] undermine the agenda-setting rights of the majority
party, and, in so doing, shift power toward the median legislator.”); Andrew J. Clarke, Jeffery A.
Jenkins & Nathan W. Monroe, From Rolls to Disappointments: Examining the Other Source of
Majority Party Failure in Congress, 70 POL. RSCH. Q. 82, 84 (2017) (noting that if the chamber
median would prefer the status quo to the agenda-setter’s ideal point, the agenda setter can only
succeed by either “do[ing] a better job of placing the proposal . . . mov[ing] the proposal just close
enough to the median voter to elicit a ‘yes’ vote from that legislator based on sincere policy-distance
preference” or by “us[ing] side-payments (of some form)” to garner a majority for its
preferred outcome).

108

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:1:85

program open to all, colloquially known as a public option. The White
House and Democratic congressional leadership did not include a public
option in the final version of the ACA, however, largely on account of
the preferences of two senators whose votes were necessary to garner
the three-fifths majority needed to overcome a Senate filibuster.89
Recent debates over tax policy and judicial nominations
illustrate a similar dynamic. Consider the power that Senator Susan
Collins (R-ME) held during 2017–18, when Republicans held a bare
majority in the Senate. During Senate debates over the 2017 Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act,90 Collins used her leverage to secure a number of
significant changes to the bill.91 The next year, the White House
reportedly sought and received Collins’s approval before nominating
then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court.92 Had Collins
denied her approval, the White House may well have nominated
someone else. This type of influence is not manifest in roll-call votes or
any other official record, but it is key to setting the agenda.
Swing voters in committees also hold power over agendas. When
several women accused Kavanaugh of sexual assault or misconduct
after he had been nominated,93 Senator Jeff Flake (R-AZ), the lone
swing voter on the Senate Judiciary Committee and one of several key
voters on the Senate floor, came to play a critical role. Flake announced
that he would only vote the nomination out of committee if the
Republican leadership allowed for a one-week FBI investigation into
one woman’s allegations against Kavanaugh. Republicans had strongly
89. See Robert Pear & David M. Herszenhorn, Lieberman Rules Out Voting for Health Bill,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2009), https://nytimes.com/2009/12/14/health/policy/14health.html
[https://perma.cc/RLJ6-6LU7]; Eric Zimmermann, Lieberman and Nelson: Public Option
Compromise Still Not Good Enough, HILL (Dec. 13, 2009, 4:15 PM EST), https://
thehill.com/homenews/senate/71967-lieberman-nelson-public-option-compromise-still-cause-forconcern [https://perma.cc/A95S-NWSQ]. These two senators, Joseph Lieberman (ID-CT) and Ben
Nelson (D-NE), differed from the paradigmatic swing voter in that there were two of them rather
than one. But they collectively held power for the same reason that a swing voter does: because of
the ideological distance between them and their nearest neighbors to the left and right.
90. Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
91. Collins claimed credit for the bill’s retention of the state and local tax deduction (albeit in
a limited form), a deduction for high medical bills, and an allowance for public employees and
employees of nonprofits to make “catch-up” contributions to their retirement accounts. See Susan
Collins, Sen. Susan Collins: New Tax Law Will Benefit Hardworking Mainers, Not Washington
Elites, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Dec. 27, 2017), https://pressherald.com/2017/12/27/sen-susancollins-new-tax-law-will-benefit-hardworking-mainers-not-washington-elites
[https://perma.cc/
3LHN-JW68].
92. Laura Bassett, Don’t Count on Susan Collins to Save Roe v. Wade, HUFFINGTON POST
(Aug. 31, 2018, 1:54 PM), https://huffingtonpost.com/entry/susan-collins-brett-kavanaugh-roe-vwade_us_5b8963d5e4b0511db3d7d20d [https://perma.cc/L39Z-TQ9M].
93. See JODI KANTOR & MEGAN TWOHEY, SHE SAID: BREAKING THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT
STORY THAT HELPED IGNITE A MOVEMENT 188–245 (2019) (providing a detailed account of the
allegations leveled against then-Judge Kavanaugh during his confirmation process).
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resisted Democratic calls for a broader FBI investigation, but they had
no choice but to relent to Flake’s demand for an investigation that was
limited in both time and scope.94 A swing voter in committee, like a
swing voter on the floor, can dictate the information and choices that
their colleagues have when voting on legislation or nominations.
D. One Dimension or Several?
Swing voter power can shape outcomes and agendas in either of
two respects. As already noted, swing voters can force moderation along
a single decisional axis, or they can make demands not directly related
to the main issue being considered. These two types of swing voter
power differ, so it is worth examining them separately.
First, swing voters can moderate outcomes and agendas, pulling
them toward the center of a unidimensional axis. Legislators’
preferences about tax rates or the minimum wage can easily be plotted
in unidimensional space. More complex legislation can be understood
as unidimensional as well, even if doing so is an oversimplification. The
ACA contained many hundreds of provisions, but the law’s general
policy scheme of expanded access without a public option can fairly be
understood as a middle ground between no health care reform, on the
one hand, and a universal, government-run health insurance program,
on the other.
Judicial swing voters can likewise moderate outcomes along a
single axis. The Supreme Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence
shows this sort of moderating influence. Contemporary Justices’
positions on affirmative action can be understood as lying on a single
axis, with a constitutional ban on all race-based affirmative action at
one pole and the allowance of all race-based affirmative action on the
other pole. For decades, three consecutive swing voters—Justices
Powell, O’Connor, and Kennedy—staked out a middle position. All
three viewed the Equal Protection Clause as permitting some forms of
affirmative action but as barring numerical racial quotas or affirmative
action justified as a remedy for past discrimination.95 These swing
94. See id. at 239–40; Michael D. Shear, Nicholas Fandos & Michael S. Schmidt, A
Tumultuous 24 Hours: How Jeff Flake Delayed a Vote on Kavanaugh, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2018),
https://nytimes.com/2018/09/28/us/politics/jeff-flake-kavanaugh-confirmation.html
[https://perma.cc/FT7Z-2E6U].
95. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311–12 (1978) (Powell, J.)
(describing “attainment of a diverse student body” as “clearly . . . a constitutionally permissible
goal for an institution of higher education”); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003)
(O’Connor, J.) (agreeing that a law school “has a compelling interest in a diverse student body,” a
position “informed by our view that attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of the Law
School’s proper institutional mission” (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318–19)); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex.,
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voters moderated doctrine, leading the Court to neither allow nor
prohibit affirmative action of all types. Instead, swing Justices led the
Court to adopt a set of rules and tests that were not the first choices of
larger blocs of voters on the left and right.96
Second, swing voters can secure concessions unrelated to the
main issue under consideration. While swing voters sometimes force
moderation on the main issue, at other times they leave that main
outcome unchanged but instead extract concessions along an entirely
different dimension.
Multidimensional dealing is pervasive in legislatures: for many
bills, the price of a winning coalition is the inclusion of provisions on
issues different from the main one under consideration.97 Key
legislators may condition their support for a bill on inclusion of targeted
benefits for their constituents, such as grants, subsidies, or regulatory
exemptions.98 But such benefits need not be geographically targeted,
and sometimes legislators demand policy changes of other types. A
group of House members nearly derailed the ACA in 2010 by seeking to
include language in the statute barring federal funding for abortions,
even though they supported the Act’s expansion of healthcare
coverage.99 When passage of a bill is a sufficiently high priority for party
leaders, virtually any side deal that enables passage of the bill’s core
provisions will be worth making—even if party leaders would prefer to
proceed with a “clean” bill. A swing voter’s influence need not be to
moderate a bill with respect to the main issue under consideration. The
swing voter can, instead, induce a bill’s supporters to modify the bill
along a different axis.
Side payments of the kind common in legislatures do not exist
in courts. There is a strong norm against judicial logrolling, whether
570 U.S. 297, 298 (2013) (Kennedy, J.) (noting that universities may account for race in admissions
when doing so “is ‘necessary’ for [a] university to . . . achieve the educational benefits of diversity”
(citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 305)).
96. Swing voters have similarly moderated constitutional doctrine in other domains.
Consider the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Justice O’Connor’s “endorsement test”
asked whether a challenged practice or display “sends a message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.” Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). This test represented a doctrinal middle
ground relative to more permissive and more restrictive approaches to the Establishment Clause.
97. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE ART OF POLITICAL MANIPULATION 150 (1986)
(“[M]anipulation of dimensions is just about the most frequently attempted [tactical maneuver],
one that politicians engage in a very large amount of the time.”).
98. See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text.
99. See LAWRENCE R. JACOBS & THEDA SKOCPOL, HEALTH CARE REFORM AND AMERICAN
POLITICS: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 118–19 (3d ed. 2015) (discussing the “Stupak
Amendment,” a proposed House amendment that would have prohibited the use of federal funds
to pay for abortion coverage, through either a public option or subsidies in health care exchanges).
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across issues within a case or across multiple cases.100 Nor do federal
judges have electoral constituents for whom they are expected to secure
particularized benefits. For these reasons, it might appear that
bargaining on side issues exists in legislatures but not in courts. If that
were the case, judicial swing voters could only moderate outcomes,
rather than introduce other dimensions.
The reality is more complex. While judicial swing voters often
play a moderating role, they can do more than move outcomes toward
their ideal point on a unidimensional axis. Several other axes of
decisionmaking—distinct from the substance of a judicial decision on a
left-right dimension—can be present in multimember courts:
• A swing judge can be offered (or can ask for) a majority opinion
that takes their preferred jurisprudential approach. Courts
often confront cases in which they face a choice between multiple
plausible rationales that could not be easily plotted on a single
axis.101 The Court’s same-sex marriage jurisprudence illustrates
this point. Though lower federal courts had proposed a variety
of constitutional justifications for a right to marry,102 Justice
Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Obergefell v. Hodges103 bore
all the hallmarks of his distinctive jurisprudence.104 It is only
because Justice Kennedy was the Court’s swing voter and
100. See F. Andrew Hessick & Jathan P. McLaughlin, Judicial Logrolling, 65 FLA. L. REV. 443,
445 & nn.6–7 (2014) (collecting sources on the norm against judicial logrolling).
101. Constitutional law provides many examples of decisions that could rest on any of several
different rationales that cannot be easily plotted on a left-right axis. Some forms of technological
surveillance may implicate both the First and Fourth Amendments. See, e.g., ACLU v. Clapper,
785 F.3d 787, 821 (2d Cir. 2015). Constitutional protections for indigent criminal defendants and
civil litigants may be grounded in due process or equal protection. See, e.g., Note, Discriminations
Against the Poor and the Fourteenth Amendment, 81 HARV. L. REV. 435, 436 (1967). Political
gerrymandering might be understood to violate the Equal Protection Clause or the First
Amendment right of free association. See, e.g., Daniel P. Tokaji, Gerrymandering and Association,
59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2159, 2161–62 (2018). Compulsory flag salutes of the sort struck down in
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), are plausibly
unconstitutional under either the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause or its Free Exercise
Clause. A court tasked with deciding which rationale to employ in any of these cases is faced with
a choice between multiple doctrinal frameworks, not merely between points on a single
unidimensional axis.
102. One federal appeals court, for example, set out three distinctive rationales for striking
down a state same-sex marriage ban, but those rationales did not lend themselves to being plotted
on an obvious left-right or otherwise unidimensional axis. See Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th
Cir. 2014). One opinion found the ban to be unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, see id. at 464 (majority opinion), a second found the ban to be unconstitutional
discrimination on the basis of gender, see id. at 479 (Berzon, J., concurring), and a third found the
ban to be a violation of a fundamental constitutional right to marry, see id. at 477 (Reinhardt,
J., concurring).
103. 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
104. See Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV.
147 (2015).
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therefore the opinion author that his preferred rationale became
the law, as opposed to a different rationale that other members
of the majority might have preferred.105
• A swing judge can be offered (or can ask for) the opportunity to
write a majority opinion. The opportunity to write a high-profile
opinion can be important to a judge interested in their legacy or
place in history.
• A swing judge can be offered (or can ask for) an opinion that does
not engage with the core merits at issue in a case. Courts have
many tools for avoiding merits questions: they can decide cases
on narrow, fact-bound grounds;106 interpret statutes to avoid
reaching constitutional questions;107 and employ various
justiciability doctrines, such as standing, ripeness, mootness, or
the political question doctrine.108 In rare cases, courts even
request that the parties resolve a matter outside of court.109
None of these various means of declining to decide can be plotted
on the same axis as a merits issue.
Each of these examples shows how judicial decisionmaking can involve
more than a single issue. There are typically fewer issues at play in
courts than in legislatures. But a judicial coalition seeking to assemble
a majority, or a swing voter deciding which coalition to join, has more
than one dimension on which to negotiate.
III. CONSTRUCTING SWING VOTERS
Swing voters are not intrinsic to multimember decisionmaking
bodies. Some bodies will never have a swing voter. Others might have
a swing voter at certain times but not at others.110 And, when a swing
105. Swing Justices likewise dictated the Court’s approach in Plyler and Heller. See supra
notes 55–59 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732
(2018) (“In this case the adjudication concerned a context that may well be different
going forward.”).
107. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record,
if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”); Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) (“When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in
question . . . it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of
the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”).
108. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO,
HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 101–266 (7th ed. 2015).
109. See, e.g., Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1560 (2016) (remanding in hope that the
parties “arrive at an approach going forward that accommodates” the interests of all
relevant stakeholders).
110. See, e.g., Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 20, at 66–67 (discussing various periods during
which the Court has and has not had what the authors refer to as a super median voter).
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voter does exist, even slight changes in a body’s composition or rules
can dislodge or disempower the swing voter.
This Part explores the ways in which swing voters are
contingent. A swing voter’s existence depends on both the ideological
distribution of voters within a decisionmaking body and the size of that
body. When a swing voter does exist, their power depends on the rules
governing the body of which they are a part. Examining these dynamics
reveals that swing voters are constructed by the thicket of rules, often
taken for granted, that structure decisionmaking bodies.
Understanding the ways in which swing voters are constructed
requires recognizing the many forms that multimember
decisionmaking bodies can take. They can be large or small. Their
procedural rules and internal organizations can vary widely. Their
members can be chosen in different ways and serve for different lengths
of time. Design choices like these impact how institutions perform as a
general matter.111 It should come as no surprise, then, that institutional
design choices can also affect both the prevalence and power of
swing voters.
A. Swing Voters’ Contingent Existence
1. Ideology
A decisionmaking body may lack a swing voter because the
pivotal voter’s views are not sufficiently ideologically distinct from those
of other voters. The defining characteristics of a swing voter set out in
Part I—a pivotal voter with preferences distant from those of their
nearest neighbors—need not exist. The members of many institutions,
at many times, are ideologically distributed in ways that do not give
rise to a swing voter.
One possible reason for the absence of a swing voter is the
presence of a unified bloc large enough to constitute a winning coalition
without any additional voters. No swing voter exists in this situation
because the pivotal voter’s preferences align with those of other bloc
members. For this reason, the House of Representatives typically does
not have a swing voter on most issues. So too, swing voters are
111. On legislative design and variation, see, for example, DAVID M. OLSON, DEMOCRATIC
LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW (Routledge 2015) (1994); THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF LEGISLATIVE STUDIES (Shane Martin, Thomas Saalfeld & Kaare W. Strøm eds.,
2014). On judicial design and variation, see, for example, VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET,
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 449–626 (3d. ed. 2014); JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN COMMON LAW
SUPREME COURTS (Brice Dickson ed., 2007). See also, generally CONSTITUTE,
https://constituteproject.org (last visited Oct. 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/J9Y9-MAG8] (collecting
national constitutions).
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frequently absent in those multimember agencies where members
“routinely vote as a bloc,”112 such as the National Labor Relations Board
(“NLRB”) and the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”). In the modern
era there has been nearly complete bloc voting on the NLRB, with
commissioners consistently dividing 3–2 along party lines in highprofile cases.113 Similarly, an analysis of FEC votes from one recent year
shows that the three Republican commissioners voted as one bloc in
every case, while the other three commissioners (two Democrats and
one Independent) voted as a bloc in all except a few circumstances.114
Swing voters also do not exist when the pivotal voter’s
preferences are very similar to their nearest neighbors. In such a
circumstance, there are multiple possible paths to a winning coalition.
This dynamic has at times existed on the Supreme Court, when several
Justices have been sufficiently ideologically clustered at the center of
the ideological distribution to deny any of them the status of singular
swing voter.115 Similar dynamics can occur in legislatures, such as when
a near-majority bloc solicits the support of many moderate legislators,
all with similar preferences, any of whom might plausibly join the bloc
in supporting a given bill. If many voters are clustered around the
pivotal voter, no single voter will be a bloc’s only path to a winning
coalition, and a swing voter will therefore not exist.
2. Size
A decisionmaking body’s size is inversely related to the
prevalence of swing voters. A swing voter exists when there is a large
ideological spread between the pivotal voter and their nearest
112. Ann Ravel, Comm’r, Fed. Election Comm’n, Keynote Address at the Brookings
Institution: The Campaign Finance Crisis in America and How to Fix It: A Solutions Summit 12
(January 21, 2016), https://brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/20160121_campaign_
finance_summit_transcript.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6V7-QJUT].
113. See Joan Flynn, A Quiet Revolution at the Labor Board: The Transformation of the NLRB,
1935–2000, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1452–53 (2000). Examples of high-profile party-line votes
include joint-employer rules relating to franchises and the recognition of unions of university
students who work as teaching and research assistants. See Noam Scheiber, Labor Board
Reverses Ruling That Helped Workers Fight Chains, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2017),
https://nytimes.com/2017/12/14/business/economy/labor-employers.html [https://perma.cc/QFS4UTM5]; Noam Scheiber, Grad Students Win Right to Unionize in an Ivy League Case, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 23, 2016), https://nytimes.com/2016/08/24/business/graduate-students-clear-hurdlein-effort-to-form-union.html [https://perma.cc/2ZM6-XL6Y].
114. Tisha Thompson, Rick Yarborough, Stephen Stock, Kevin Nious, Steve Jones & Jeff
Piper, Deadlock: FEC Commissioners Say They’re Failing to Investigate Campaign Violations,
NBC NEWS-4 WASH., https://nbcwashington.com/news/local/deadlock-fec-commissioners-saytheyre-failing-to-investigate-campaign-violations-2/114705 (last updated Sept. 20, 2016, 6:35 PM)
[https://perma.cc/92TW-UPGU].
115. See, e.g., Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 20, at 75 & fig.8 (illustrating the lack of a swing
Justice in the 1965 term).
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neighbors. The larger a decisionmaking body is, the more crowded the
ideological distribution of voters will be. The result is that larger bodies
are, all else equal, less likely to have large spreads between the
preferences of the pivotal voter and those of other voters.
A brief look at U.S. institutions supports the intuition that
smaller decisionmaking bodies are more prone to having swing voters.
Swing voters are quite common on the nine-member Supreme Court.116
As institutions grow, swing voters become less prevalent. Swing voters
sometimes exist in the hundred-member Senate and comparably sized
state legislative bodies,117 but they are not a fixture in the way they
have been on the Supreme Court. Swing voters are much rarer in the
435-member House of Representatives.118 In such a large body, there is
almost never significant ideological spacing between the pivotal voter
and their nearest neighbors on the left and right for a swing voter to
exist. It is possible, in theory, for even a large decisionmaking body to
have a swing voter, given a very particular ideological distribution of
its members. And it is possible for a small body to lack a swing voter,
as in the case of small multimember agencies whose members vote in
partisan blocs.119 But all else equal, smaller bodies are more likely than
larger ones to have swing voters.
B. Swing Voters’ Contingent Power
1. Decisionmaking Procedures: Courts
The procedural rules that govern multimember institutions are
not neutral with respect to swing voters. Instead, such rules shape the
extent and character of swing voter power. On courts, rules dictate how
panels are composed, how opinion-writing responsibilities are allocated,

116. See id. at 67 (“Justice Kennedy is only the most recent example of a super median. Taken
collectively, our data suggest that since the onset of the Warren Court era in 1953, five others
achieved that status: Justices Clark, Goldberg, White, Powell, and O’Connor.”).
117. State lower chambers range in size from twenty to sixty-seven members, while state
upper chambers range in size from forty to 203 members (excluding one extreme outlier). See
Number of Legislators and Length of Terms in Years, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Aug.
9, 2019), https://ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/number-of-legislators-and-length-ofterms.aspx [https://perma.cc/V4L4-RLV8]. For an example of swing voter power in a state
legislature, see supra note 70 and accompanying text.
118. Given the size of the House, a single voter is decisive only in rare circumstances. See, e.g.,
Karen Tumulty, When a Hard Vote Ends a Political Career, TIME: SWAMPLAND (Mar. 3, 2010),
https://swampland.time.com/2010/03/03/when-a-hard-vote-ends-a-political-career [https://perma.
cc/FDQ8-34JA] (describing the decisive vote on President Clinton’s economic plan cast by Rep.
Marjorie Margolies-Mezvinsky (D-PA)).
119. See supra notes 112–114 and accompanying text.
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and how much precedential weight different opinions receive. Each of
these types of rules bears on the extent of swing voter power.
Swing voter power on a multimember court is at its apex when
every decision is made by the full court, sitting en banc. The Supreme
Court dynamics discussed in Part II result from the Court sitting as a
full court of nine Justices. This enables a swing voter to dictate
outcomes, and the Court’s agenda can come to reflect the swing voter’s
real or perceived preferences.
Swing voters hold less power when courts sit in panels. Every
federal circuit court employs three-judge panels for appeals.120 High
courts of many democratic nations similarly use panels.121 Constituting
panels by random or semi-random draw prevents the same judge from
repeatedly acting as the swing voter across many panels and issues.
Because assignment of judges to panels takes place long after cases
have been initiated, and in many instances after the parties have
submitted their briefs, it is difficult for parties to litigate cases
strategically to appeal to a swing voter. Some recent proposals
advocating for a larger U.S. Supreme Court seek to harness this feature
of panels. Under a panel system, proponents of one reform proposal
note, “[n]o Justice would be able to advance an ideological agenda over
decades of service, and no Justice would be the single swing voter over
a period of years (and thus targeted by the lion’s share of advocacy).”122
Even if a court uses panels, a swing voter on the full court can
still exercise power if rules allow the full court to review panel decisions.
But even in courts that allow panel decisions to be reconsidered by the
full court, the panel’s decision is still the last word in the vast majority
120. See 28 U.S.C. § 46. One circuit allows litigants to petition from a three-judge panel for
consideration by a larger panel. See 9TH CIR. R. 35-3 (“The en banc court . . . shall consist of the
Chief Judge of this circuit and 10 additional judges to be drawn by lot from the active judges of
the Court.”).
121. See, e.g., Bundesverfassungsgerichts-Gesetz [BVerfGE] [Law on the Federal
Constitutional Court], Mar. 12 1951, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, TEIL I [BGBL I] at 1473, §§ 2, 14–16,
https://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=221 [https://perma.cc/98X7-KHKR] (Germany); Panel
Numbers Criteria, SUP. CT., https://supremecourt.uk/procedures/panel-numbers-criteria.html
(last visited Oct. 23, 2020) [https://perma.cc/7EJB-L6A9] (United Kingdom); The Judiciary: The
Court System, ISR. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS., https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/aboutisrael/state/
democracy/pages/the%20judiciary-%20the%20court%20system.aspx (last visited Oct. 1, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/69YK-5GRE] (Israel).
122. Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Supreme Court, 129 YALE L.J. 148,
183 (2019); see also Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Remaking the United States Supreme Court
in the Courts’ of Appeals Image, 58 DUKE L.J. 1439, 1470 (2009) (noting that under a panel system
“it is much less likely that one or two swing justices (a la Justice O’Connor or Justice Kennedy)
would have disproportionate weight on the Court”). Panel composition would have to be random
to prevent gamesmanship in the composition of panels. Cf. Lori Hausegger & Stacia Haynie,
Judicial Decisionmaking and the Use of Panels in the Canadian Supreme Court and the South
African Appellate Division, 37 L. & SOC’Y REV. 635, 654–55 (2003) (finding that ideology shapes
how chief justices make panel assignments in Canada and South Africa).
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of cases. Federal courts of appeals allow for en banc review, but only a
vanishingly small number of cases are actually heard en banc.123 As a
practical matter, the three-judge panel typically has the last word.
Rules concerning opinion assignment also shape swing voter
power. Discretionary opinion assignment empowers swing voters
because blocs can offer the swing voter the chance to write the majority
opinion and swing voters can condition their joining a bloc on their
being permitted to write for the majority. But opinion assignment need
not be discretionary. State supreme courts provide a range of
alternative models of opinion assignment, including assignment by
random draw or rotation among judges.124 These approaches to opinion
assignment reduce a swing voter’s power by preventing the swing voter
from writing majority opinions in an outsized number of major cases.
Even if a swing voter can still make demands on their colleagues about
the content of opinions—perhaps even threatening to change their vote
if a majority opinion does not reflect their preferred views—making
such demands can be costly for the swing voter, especially in small and
collegial bodies. Swing voters can exert some influence over the content
of opinions that they do not author, but their power in such cases is
lower than it is when they author majority opinions themselves.
Rules dictating how much precedential weight different judicial
opinions have can likewise favor or disfavor swing voters. When all
members of a majority sign on to the same opinion, that opinion’s
reasoning controls. But when a majority is fractured as to its reasoning,
which opinion should govern? One approach is the Supreme Court’s
Marks rule: “When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.”125
The Marks rule allows swing Justices to dictate the content of precedent
even if no other Justice agrees with their reasoning. A swing Justice
might even self-describe their approach as narrow in order to encourage
other courts to take their view as controlling under Marks.126 And the
123. See Ryan Vacca, Acting Like an Administrative Agency: The Federal Circuit En Banc, 76
MO. L. REV. 733, 738 (2011) (calculating based on data provided by the federal judiciary that
federal courts in the early 2000s resolved between 0.01 and 0.23 percent of their cases en banc).
124. See Melinda Gann Hall, Opinion Assignment Procedures and Conference Practices in
State Supreme Courts, 73 JUDICATURE 209, 210 tbl.1 (1990) (describing opinion assignment
practices in all fifty state supreme courts and finding that more than half used either random draw
or rotation in opinion assignment).
125. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (internal quotation marks omitted).
126. See, e.g., Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 622 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment) (describing the plurality’s test as “cut[ting] too broadly” and proposing instead “a
narrower test”); see also Richard M. Re, Beyond the Marks Rule, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1942, 1973
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rule can deter compromise: there is little reason for a swing Justice to
join a bloc’s opinion or reasoning if they know that their solo opinion—
so long as it is narrower than that of the plurality—will be treated as
binding precedent.
Other approaches to precedent would reduce swing voter power,
relative to the Marks rule. If the reasoning for the holding that
commanded the most votes was deemed controlling, solo opinions by a
swing voter could not control. Under such an approach, a swing voter
could only dictate doctrine if they could secure a majority of the majority
in favor of their reasoning. Critics of the Marks rule have proposed
other rules dictating which opinion (if any) should be controlling when
five Justices cannot agree on a shared rationale. Under one approach,
“Instead of asking about the ‘narrowest grounds,’ courts should simply
ask whether a single rule of decision has the express support of at least
five Justices.”127 On another view, a divided judgment should be treated
as precedential in a future case only when “the reasons provided by each
of the Justices whose vote was necessary to the judgment in the
precedent case would compel the same result.”128 Though these
alternatives to the Marks rule were not formulated with the intent of
reducing swing voter power, they would have that effect by denying
swing voters the ability to create precedent when they speak only
for themselves.
2. Decisionmaking Procedures: Legislatures
Rules likewise shape swing voter power in legislatures. Rules
that empower rank-and-file members can be especially potent in the
hands of swing voters, and rules allowing logrolling can empower swing
voters in some circumstances while limiting their influence in others.
Procedural rules that give rank-and-file legislators more
opportunity to modify proposed legislation also give swing voters
greater power to influence outcomes. In Congress, many rules shape
how open or closed the legislative process is. At one extreme, in the
House, a bill may be presented under an open rule, which allows any
and all amendments to be introduced.129 Under such a rule, a swing
voter would have enormous leverage in seeking to modify a bill. They

(2019) (“[D]ozens—though not all—lower courts have followed [Justice Kennedy’s] lead [in
Seibert], with many quoting his opinion’s self-description as ‘narrower’ than the plurality.”).
127. Re, supra note 126, at 1946.
128. Ryan C. Williams, Questioning Marks: Plurality Decisions and Precedential Constraint,
69 STAN. L. REV. 795, 802 (2017).
129. Such open rules are rare in the contemporary Congress. See BARBARA SINCLAIR,
UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS 28 (5th ed. 2017).
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could seek to moderate the bill, moving it away from either the left or
right side of the ideological distribution and toward their ideal point.
Or they could make a demand on an entirely different issue, such as by
amending the bill to address a different policy matter of importance to
them or their constituents. The coalition seeking to pass the bill would
face significant pressure to comply with the swing voter’s demands,
knowing that if they did not capitulate to the swing voter, the swing
voter might vote against the bill and prevent it from passing.
The legislative process is not always so open. Congressional
rules often lead to members facing narrow or binary choices.
Unanimous consent agreements typically restrict amendment activity
in the Senate,130 and bills often arrive on the House floor under closed
rules prohibiting all amendments or special rules severely limiting
amendments.131 Congress’s rules do not allow any amendments or
modifications when Congress operates under certain special
procedures, such as when it considers resolutions under the
Congressional Review Act132 or fast-track trade authority.133 Legislators
instead must simply vote for or against the resolution. The same holds
in the Senate for votes on whether to confirm executive branch or
judicial nominees.134 These restrictive rules do not eliminate swing
voter power altogether. When a swing voter exists, they can still be
decisive as to whether the yeas or nays prevail. But more restrictive
amending rules will typically limit the swing voter to choosing between
two predefined options, rather than empowering them to expand the
range of possible outcomes.
Even on matters that arise as binary choices, swing voters can
seek to shape the agenda by trying to influence which binary choice is
put to the chamber. A Senate swing voter could make clear to the
president which judicial nominees they would and would not vote to
confirm, which in turn could influence the president’s choice of who to
nominate.135 But these sorts of actions can be costly for the swing voter,
in terms of both the foresight and political capital that they require. A

130. VALERIE HEITSHUSEN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 96-548, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS ON THE
SENATE FLOOR: AN INTRODUCTION 7–8 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/96-548.pdf [https://
perma.cc/EED7-YN7F].
131. See Michael Doran, The Closed Rule, 59 EMORY L.J. 1363, 1366 (2010).
132. 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808.
133. See IAN F. FERGUSSON & CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43491, TRADE
PROMOTION AUTHORITY (TPA): FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2019), https://crsreports.
congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43491 [https://perma.cc/6PRZ-GTE2] (“[Trade Promotion Authority]
ensures time-limited congressional consideration and an up-or-down vote with no amendments.”).
134. See SENATE RULES, supra note 26, at Rule XXXI.
135. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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more closed legislative process limits the tools that swing voters can use
to influence outcomes.
Rules governing logrolling can also impact swing voter power,
though the exact effects will vary based on the ideological distribution
of legislators. Logrolling entails an implicit or explicit trade, in which a
first voter agrees to take a position important to a second voter, while
the second voter agrees to take a position important to the first. This
frequently occurs through linking multiple proposals together. In
Congress, many appropriations are typically bundled into large bills,
and substantive legislation often contains amendments unrelated to the
core topic of the bill.136 Internal procedural rules, ranging from earmark
rules137 to single-subject rules,138 bear on how easy or difficult
logrolling is.
Logrolling is a double-edged sword for swing voters. On the one
hand, rules enabling logrolling can make it easier for swing voters, who
already have leverage within the chamber, to make demands of party
leaders and others in exchange for their vote. The more lax a
legislature’s rules are with respect to logrolling, the easier it will be for
swing voters to extract side payments in exchange for their vote on a
matter under consideration.
On the other hand, logrolling can help other legislators
circumvent swing voters by allowing for the formation of coalitions that
could not otherwise exist. Most modestly, a strategic logroll could allow
a left coalition to gain the majority by picking up the vote of the member
just to the right of the swing voter, or vice versa. More dramatically,
logrolling can allow for unusual coalitions, drawing significant support
from both left and right. In either instance, the legislator who would be
pivotal in one-dimensional space will no longer be able to
dictate outcomes.
The federal farm bill exemplifies how logrolls can create unusual
coalitions. The farm bill links food stamps and agricultural subsidies in
a single bill.139 If either the food stamp program or agricultural
136. See, e.g., Diana Evans, Policy and Pork: The Use of Pork Barrel Projects to Build Policy
Coalitions in the House of Representatives, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 894 (1994).
137. See Mariano-Florantino Cuéllar, Earmarking Earmarking, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
249 (2012).
138. Such rules, which exist in many state legislatures, prevent logrolling by limiting each bill
to a single subject. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT,
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 176–81 (2d ed. 2006).
139. For an account of the origins of this linkage, see, for example, John A. Ferejohn,
Logrolling in an Institutional Context: A Case Study of Food Stamp Legislation, in CONGRESS AND
POLICY CHANGE 223, 227–50 (Gerald C. Wright, Leroy N. Rieselbach & Lawrence C. Dodd eds.,
1986). See also Jerry Hagstrom, Food Stamps Are Key Component to Getting Farm Bill Passed,
NAT. J. (Apr. 10, 2013), https://nationaljournal.com/s/81264/food-stamps-are-key-componentgetting-farm-bill-passed [https://perma.cc/EF2S-R3UQ].
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subsidies were voted on individually, something resembling a
traditional left-right divide would likely emerge on each issue. Instead,
by linking the two issues, unusual coalitions of members from both the
left and right side of the ideological spectrum have historically ensured
the bill’s passage.140 The legislators with the strongest preferences
about the two policy areas—mostly urban Democrats for food stamps,
and mostly rural Republicans for agricultural subsidies—can together
create a majority coalition for the two sets of policies. By allowing the
two issues to be bundled in a single bill, congressional rules allow
entrepreneurial legislators to circumvent the chamber’s pivotal voter.
Finally, decisionmaking procedures in other institutions can at
times enhance or diminish the power of swing legislators. Statutory
interpretation methodologies provide a good example. Some scholars
have argued that, in interpreting statutes, courts should seek to
reconstruct the legislative bargain such that the intent of the pivotal
voter (or group of voters) would become central to statutory
interpretation.141 The general advantages and disadvantages of such an
approach are beyond this Article’s scope. Relevant here, however, is the
fact that methods of statutory interpretation that look to pivotal
legislators would give those legislators’ views more weight than would
other sorts of approaches to statutory interpretation—whether
textualist, purposivist, or otherwise. Statutory interpretation, then, is
yet another lever that can ratchet up or down the power of legislative
swing voters.
3. Competing Power Centers
Institutions with internal hierarchies or multiple power centers
have natural counterweights to swing voter power. A flat hierarchy
allows a swing voter maximum power. More complex structures—such
as chamber leadership or internal committees with control over
agendas—can dilute swing voter power. The more power other members

140. See, e.g., Final Vote Results for Roll Call 31, OFF. OF THE CLERK, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, https://clerk.house.gov/evs/2014/roll031.xml (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) [https://
perma.cc/N29N-LRE8] (documenting a vote of 162–63 among House Republicans and 89–103
among House Democrats).
141. See, e.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of
Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U.
PA. L. REV. 1417, 1422 (2003) (“Our fundamental claim is that the nature and scope of the bargain
struck by the ardent supporters with the coalition of pivotal legislators is central to the meaning
of the statute.”); McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory
Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 725 (1992) (“How is a court to proceed in implementing an
interpretive standard that plausibly represents the agreement of the enacting coalition? This
entails the discovery of the preferences of the pivotal members of the enacting coalition.”).

122

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:1:85

of a decisionmaking body have, the less that remains for the
swing voter.
U.S. legislative chambers are illustrative in this regard. Such
chambers, especially smaller ones, sometimes have a swing voter. There
are other power centers as well, however, created by both rules and
norms. Party leaders, committee chairs, and subcommittee chairs wield
significant power in two respects: they control legislative agendas, and
they can reward or punish rank-and-file legislators. These other power
centers serve as counterweights to swing voter power.
Party leaders exercise control over which bills come to the floor,
in what order, and under what conditions. Specifics vary across
chambers, but control of the floor is one of party leadership’s most
important powers. Committee and subcommittee chairs similarly have
some degree of agenda control in their respective domains. This
organization provides a counterweight to swing voter power. Party
leadership, in particular, is likely to hold preferences well to the left or
right of any swing voter.142 Committee or subcommittee chairs will
likely hew the party line more so than a swing voter who, by definition,
has preferences distant from those of their copartisans.143 Party leaders,
committee chairs, and subcommittee chairs can and do use their formal
control of the agenda to pursue priorities that diverge from swing voter
preferences. A swing voter can, of course, make demands on those who
control agendas. But no swing voter has the capacity to monitor all
pending matters and insist that all committee and floor activity conform
to their preferences.
Party leaders also have various points of leverage over swing
voters.144 Party leaders often control committee assignments and
committee chairmanships, which they can use as carrots or sticks in
attempting to secure party loyalty from swing voters or other wayward

142. Some political scientists view party leaders as representative of party medians while
others view them as more extreme than party medians. See Stephen Jessee & Neil Malhotra, Are
Congressional Leaders Middlepersons or Extremists? Yes, 35 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 361, 361–65 (2011)
(reviewing literature on both positions). But in either case, party leaders will be well to the left
(for Democrats) or right (for Republicans) of the chamber’s median voter.
143. On theories of committee composition and ideology, see Tim Groseclose & David C. King,
Committee Theories Reconsidered, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 191, 191–97 (Lawrence C. Dodd &
Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 2001). For an example of a committee chair being replaced when they
strayed too far from the party line, see Patrick O’Connor, Waxman Dethrones Dingell as Chairman,
POLITICO (Nov. 20, 2008, 10:53 AM EST), https://politico.com/story/2008/11/waxman-dethronesdingell-as-chairman-015822 [https://perma.cc/9X3F-AL32].
144. A wide range of institutional mechanisms can ratchet up or down the power of party
leaders over rank-and-file legislators, including swing voters. See generally Jonathan S. Gould,
The Law of Legislative Representation, 107 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021); Gregory A. Elinson,
Fractured Parties and the Separation of Powers (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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caucus members.145 Party leaders also steer campaign funds to party
members, providing another tool for inducing loyalty.146 Some other
legislators have distinctive power of their own: chairs of committees
with jurisdiction over appropriations, for example, can seek to steer
government funds toward or away from a swing voter’s district,
depending on how the swing voter behaves. Each of these powers
weakens swing voters by putting them at the mercy of other legislators.
Rules that disempower party leaders and committee chairs, by contrast,
may empower swing voters by weakening competing power centers.
Courts rarely have as many competing power centers as
legislatures. But courts sometimes assign some judges, most often chief
judges, with special prerogatives that can serve as counterweights to
swing voter power. On the U.S. Supreme Court, the Chief Justice
assigns opinions when they are in the majority. Other nations’ supreme
courts assign their chief judges even greater power: some chief judges
have the power to decide how large a panel will be or even to assign
which judges hear which cases.147 Rules or norms that empower chief
judges or other judges can diminish swing voter power by creating
alternate centers of power.
4. (In)stability
Finally, swing voter power depends on at least a minimal degree
of institutional stability. Swing voters hold more power when they
retain that status for an extended period of time. Frequent changes in
a decisionmaking body’s composition, by contrast, can dislodge a swing
voter when one exists. This instability limits the power of swing voters.
Law determines the degree of stability or instability in an
institution of government. Legal rules can provide for long or short
terms of service: members of the House and many state legislatures are
elected for only two-year terms,148 while federal judges serve for life.149
Most institutions, including many legislative chambers and
multimember commissions, have term lengths somewhere between
145. See, e.g., Nicole Asmussen & Adam Ramey, When Loyalty Is Tested: Do Party Leaders Use
Committee Assignments as Rewards?, 45 CONG. & PRESIDENCY 41 (2018) (showing empirically that
party leaders use committee assignments to reward members who vote with leadership on
key issues).
146. See MARIAN CURRINDER, MONEY IN THE HOUSE: CAMPAIGN FUNDS AND CONGRESSIONAL
PARTY POLITICS 36–39 (2008).
147. BENJAMIN ALARIE & ANDREW J. GREEN, COMMITMENT AND COOPERATION ON HIGH
COURTS: A CROSS-COUNTRY EXAMINATION OF INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON JUDGES 102–03,
121 (2017).
148. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (specifying that House members serve two-year terms).
149. Id. art. III, § 1, cl. 2 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold
their Offices during good Behaviour . . . .”).
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these extremes.150 Separate from term length is another variable:
whether turnover is staggered. Changes in membership may happen
simultaneously for all members (as in the House), may be partially
staggered (as in the Senate), or may happen one by one (as in the federal
courts). Even if terms are long, like in the Senate, if turnover is
staggered there can be frequent changes in the body’s membership. In
addition, legislative districts can be drawn to be either safer or more
competitive, with consequences for the frequency of turnover. Each of
these sorts of rules influence whether the same individual is likely to
be able to serve as a swing voter for an extended period of time.151
Even when a swing voter exists, it is harder to identify that
swing voter in a body with frequently changing membership. A swing
voter’s existence depends on their preferences relative to the
preferences of their colleagues. But the preferences of a legislator,
judge, or other member of a decisionmaking body do not instantly reveal
themselves. Only after a significant number of votes is it possible to
discern precisely where each individual’s preferences lie. New members’
preferences may not be fully known. The result is that even if a swing
voter exists in theory, others might not know who the swing voter is.
This, in turn, reduces the swing voter’s power, which we have seen
depends in large part on being recognized as a swing voter by others.
Moreover, it is only possible to plan agendas around swing voter
preferences when that swing voter is likely to remain a swing voter in
the near future. In the judicial context, it can take several years for a
case to wind its way from an initial filing to an appellate or high court
decision. If a court’s composition changes frequently, it is hard for
litigants to strategically tailor suits and arguments to a swing judge.
Even when a swing judge does exist, frequent turnover would prevent
litigants from initiating cases designed to appeal to the swing judge.
*

*

*

The fact that the existence and power of swing voters depends
on legal rules opens the door to possible reforms. Whether one wishes
to enhance or limit the prevalence of swing voters or the extent of their
power, there are many levers to be pulled.
150. See, e.g., id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (six-year Senate terms); NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
supra note 117 (four-year terms in most states’ upper chambers and some states’ lower chambers);
47 U.S.C. § 154(c)(1)(A) (five-year terms for FCC commissioners); 15 U.S.C. § 41 (seven-year terms
for FTC commissioners).
151. In addition to law, norms can also bear on stability: legislators sometimes resign partway
through a legislative session, while norms dictating that Supreme Court Justices resign between
two of the Court’s year-long terms promote stability during the course of each term.
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For those who seek to increase the likelihood that swing voters
exist, the most important variable that institutional designers can
manipulate is size: the smaller an institution is, the more likely the
ideological preconditions for the presence of a swing voter will be met.
When swing voters do exist, their power can be enhanced through
maximally flexible procedures that give the swing voter the ability to
bargain with their colleagues and make demands with respect to both
agendas and outcomes. And swing voter power is at its height when
membership in a decisionmaking body is stable, with longer terms and
infrequent turnover.
Those looking to weaken swing voters likewise have tools at
their disposal. Increasing the size of an institution makes it less likely
that a swing voter will exist. When a swing voter does exist, internal
procedures can disempower the swing voter. In legislatures, highly
structured procedures for how bills are considered and limits on
amending activity can reduce the ability of swing voters to bargain.
Empowering party leaders and committee chairs can create competing
power centers, especially when those competing power centers have
points of leverage over swing voters. In courts, swing voters can be
weakened by deciding cases in panels rather than a full court, by
assigning opinions by rotation or random draw, or by rules that prevent
solo opinions from carrying precedential weight.
But should any of these reforms be undertaken? Answering that
question requires a normative theory of swing voter power.
IV. EVALUATING SWING VOTER POWER
Evaluating swing voter power is trickier than it may seem at
first glance. Any judgment about swing voter power depends on the
answers to a variety of contestable normative questions, including
questions about the importance of moderation and stability in
multimember decisionmaking bodies. Evaluating swing voter power in
a particular institution further depends on both a normative
assessment of how the institution should function and an empirical
assessment of whether swing voters advance or hinder the good
functioning of the institution. Recognizing the inevitable disagreement
on these issues,152 this Part catalogues the various values that are at
stake when we talk about swing voter power. Those values do not
provide an easy way of evaluating swing voter power, but they do show
what is at stake in the conversation.

152. Cf. JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 1–4 (1999).
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A. Decisional Moderation
Swing voters often moderate collective decisions, leading to
outcomes that lie between those favored by their colleagues to the left
and right. This moderating impact might seem to provide a way of
evaluating swing voters. If moderation is desirable in courts,
legislatures, or other multimember bodies, that fact favors institutional
designs that give rise to or empower swing voters. If moderation is
undesirable, decisionmaking bodies should be designed to minimize
swing voter prevalence and power.
This approach to evaluating swing voters and their power faces
significant limits. Most obviously, it necessarily rests on contestable,
substantive views about law and policy. Moderation will be more or less
attractive depending on one’s views about what outcomes should be. In
any given context, welfarists, egalitarians, and libertarians might take
different views of swing voters—members of one of those groups might
find themselves wishing for a powerful swing voter, while members of
another might find themselves lamenting swing voter power. In the face
of widespread disagreement, any account of swing voters resting on a
particular theory of justice is necessarily limited.
Even if we could all agree on an ideological fixed point from
which to evaluate swing voter power, political context would still make
it difficult to do so. The effects of swing voter power will change as a
body’s politics and membership change. Empowering a swing voter
might advance a given value in the present but undermine that same
value in the future, or vice versa, as the ideological distribution of a
body’s members changes. Swing voter power might also promote a given
value in one institution but undercut it in another. An outcomes-focused
analysis could allow those with particular views to praise or condemn a
particular swing voter in a particular institution at a particular
moment in time—but it does not lend itself to more general conclusions
about swing voter power.153
B. Stability
Another factor, closely related to moderation, is stability. Swing
voters often lessen the degree of change relative to what might
153. Another approach would focus on the relationship between swing voters and compromise.
Critics of contemporary U.S. politics have noted the growth of “an uncompromising mindset, a
cluster of attitudes and arguments that encourage standing on principle and mistrusting
opponents.” AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS F. THOMPSON, THE SPIRIT OF COMPROMISE: WHY GOVERNING
DEMANDS IT AND CAMPAIGNING UNDERMINES IT 3 (2012). Linking up swing voters with
compromise might be a way to evaluate their role in democratic institutions. If swing voters were
to promote compromise between left and right, allowing the two sides to come together around a
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otherwise occur. Part II provides examples of swing voters limiting
rapid or dramatic changes that might otherwise have taken place. In
Congress, the ACA was landmark legislation, to be sure, but it produced
less of a change from the status quo than it would have if swing voters
had not prevented the inclusion of a public option.154 On the Court,
Heller recognized an individual right to bear arms for the first time, but
a swing voter ensured that the decision would not lead to the
overturning of several longstanding types of firearms regulations.155 In
these instances, and others, swing voters help maintain relative
stability of law or policy, as compared to more dramatic changes that
could have occurred if swing voters exercised less power.
Evaluations of this sort of stability rest on two sets of judgments.
The first is a normative assessment of the status quo. Those with
favorable views of the status quo might endorse swing voter power as a
means of promoting stability—or, put differently, as a means of making
it more difficult for either liberals or conservatives to make changes
that would depart too dramatically from a positive (or at least tolerable)
status quo. Those who are more critical of the status quo might view
swing voters, and the stability that they bring, as obstacles to muchneeded change.
Second, assessments of the stability that swing voters can
provide rest on perceptions of the risks and rewards that might come
from changes to law or policy.156 Feelings about potential change are
distinct from views of the status quo: someone who is satisfied with the
status quo may still be optimistic about future change being even
better, while someone disappointed with the current state of affairs may
nonetheless be fearful about a further turn for the worse. Optimism
about the likely direction and extent of future changes may imply
skepticism about swing voters, given that swing voters could temper
those changes. Pessimism about such future changes may imply an
embrace of swing voters for the same reason. A sufficiently large risk
that law or policy would change for the worse157 counts in favor of
institutional arrangements that temper change—with rules that
enhance swing voter power serving as one such mechanism.
picture of the common good, proponents of compromise would have reasons to want to enhance
swing voter power. But swing voters typically pick winners between rival parties or ideological
factions. In so doing, they sometimes induce one side or the other to moderate their position. But
swing voters rarely bridge divides between opposing parties or factions on highly contested issues.
154. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text.
156. On constitutionalism as a means of regulating political risk, see generally ADRIAN
VERMEULE, THE CONSTITUTION OF RISK (2014).
157. Or a smaller risk that it would change for the worse in such a dramatic fashion that even
the small risk is intolerable.
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Stability, like moderation, is not a strictly neutral value. To the
extent that swing voters and swing voter power are stability-enhancing
features of institutions, evaluating them will turn on the value of
stability. And that value depends on contestable judgments, both
normative and empirical, about the status quo and changes that may
take place in the future.
C. Institutional Context
General values like moderation and stability do not get us very
far in assessing swing voters and their power. What about more specific
institutional contexts? Swing voters might be a positive force in one
setting and a negative force in another. Taking stock of swing voter
power requires attention to the specific features of the institutions in
which they wield power.
Consider, first, the distinctive context of courts. The Supreme
Court is famously beset with a countermajoritarian difficulty that
arises from the power of unelected Justices to strike down legislation
passed by a democratic Congress.158 Against this backdrop,
assessments of swing voters on the Court may rest in part on the
importance that one attaches to the Court’s sociological legitimacy, the
“belief by citizens, whether warranted or not, that particular claims to
authority deserve respect or obedience.”159 One sitting Justice has noted
that the presence of a swing voter long “enabled the [C]ourt to look as
though it was not owned by one side or another and was indeed
impartial and neutral and fair.”160 This view links the Court’s
sociological legitimacy to the presence of a moderate swing voter.
Assuming this link exists, views about the importance of a swing voter
on the Court should vary with the importance that observers attach to
the Court’s sociological legitimacy. Those who attach great importance
to the Court’s sociological legitimacy will want to create the conditions
for swing voters to exist and exercise power. Those who value the
Court’s sociological legitimacy less than other values—such as

158. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002). The term
“countermajoritarian difficulty” dates to the mid-twentieth century. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–23 (1962).
159. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1795
(2005). The description of this form of legitimacy as “sociological” contrasts it with what Fallon
calls “moral legitimacy” and “legal legitimacy.” Id. at 1794–1801.
160. Sophie Tatum, Justice Kagan Worries About the ‘Legitimacy’ of a Politically Divided
Supreme Court, CNN (Oct. 5, 2018, 10:06 PM ET), https://cnn.com/2018/10/05/politics/supremecourt-elena-kagan-legitimacy/index.html
[https://perma.cc/HT4L-2A8M]
(quoting
Justice
Elena Kagan).
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democratic values or the importance of arriving at the “right” answer
on legal questions161—may be indifferent or even hostile to judicial
swing voters.162
Other values might also be particularly important in courts as
compared to in other institutions. Many believe that the value of
stability, discussed above in general terms, holds special sway in the
judicial context because of the relationship between stability and the
rule of law.163 In the Supreme Court’s words, “the very concept of the
rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity
over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition,
indispensable.”164 Stare decisis does not mean that doctrine cannot
change, but it does slow the speed of such change.165 Stare decisis is
distinct to courts: there is not a parallel principle (either legal or
normative) preventing the elected branches of government from making
dramatic or abrupt policy changes.166 If stability indeed assumes special
importance in courts, judicial swing voters might be more defensible
than their counterparts in other institutions.
Legislatures are very different from courts, but a more
contextual analysis can also inform how we assess swing legislators’
power. Imagine a swing voter in a legislative chamber. When such a
voter exists in a majority-rule chamber with two parties, the swing
161. There is significant disagreement among scholars of jurisprudence as to whether legal
questions have right answers in the first instance. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 335–48 (2013 ed.).
162. Cf. Tara Leigh Grove, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Dilemma, 132 HARV. L.
REV. 2240, 2272 (2019) (reviewing RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME
COURT (2018)) (noting a “legitimacy dilemma,” wherein “a steadfast commitment to sociological
legitimacy may lead a Justice to compromise the legal legitimacy of her own rulings”).
163. See Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach, 111 MICH.
L. REV. 1, 3, 26–29 (2012).
164. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
165. See Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1173,
1184 (2006) (noting that “constitutional law is able to grow and change” but that “these changes
generally occur incrementally”).
166. In the United States, the extent of a policy change will not be a legal strike against it so
long as the policy change is within the authority of the relevant lawmaking entity, does not violate
individual rights, and is not irrational. On this last score, courts are generally deferential to policy
changes made by the elected branches. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487
(1955) (“[I]t is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of
[legislative] requirements.”); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part) (“A change in administration brought about by
the people casting their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal
of the costs and benefits of its programs and regulations.”). Some legal philosophers have warned
against systems that make “such frequent changes in the rules that the subject cannot orient his
action by them.” LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (rev. ed. 1969). But few changes in law
would run afoul of this principle, which permits a much broader range of changes—and permits
them to occur much more quickly—as compared to the principle of stare decisis in the
judicial context.
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voter will necessarily be a member of the majority party—but a
wayward member with different preferences from their copartisans.167
Evaluating a legislative swing voter would therefore rest on both a
theory of party loyalty and a more general account of the role of parties
in legislatures. On one account, the swing voter, by breaking from the
party line, undermines what some political scientists call “responsible
party government”: the idea that parties in power should be able to
pursue coherent programs such that voters may electorally reward or
punish a party depending on their views about the party’s program.168
Others dissent from the responsible parties thesis,169 instead
emphasizing other aspects of legislative representation, such as the
importance of a legislator’s responsiveness to their constituents,
regardless of party pressures.170 On a view of representation that is
more critical of parties, swing voters might be viewed as admirably
resisting party pressures to better represent their constituents.
Whether it is good or bad for swing voters to exercise power within a
legislative body turns on one’s theory of the proper role of parties and
party loyalty in legislative bodies.
D. Swing Voter Performance
Another question to ask in evaluating swing voters is whether
those voters are more or less likely than their colleagues to act as “good”
judges or legislators, on whatever set of criteria one thinks is
appropriate for evaluating individuals holding those roles. This
approach focuses on the relationship between swing voters and
institution-specific virtues, independent of views about policy. In
pursuing this line of thinking, my focus is not on the behavior of
particular swing voters in particular circumstances. Anyone with
opinions about law and policy will find some actions by swing voters to
praise and some to condemn. Rather, my focus is more institutional and
167. The median voter in a two-party majority-rule institution—such as the 218th House
member—is necessarily a member of the majority party. In order to also be a swing voter, this
median voter must be a wayward member of the majority party, because if they held preferences
in accordance with party orthodoxy, the ideological distance from nearest neighbors necessary for
a swing voter to exist would be absent. See supra Section I.B.2.
168. See COMM. ON POL. PARTIES, AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N, TOWARD A MORE RESPONSIBLE TWOPARTY SYSTEM 20 (1950) (identifying a need for greater party loyalty); see also SAM ROSENFELD,
THE POLARIZERS: POSTWAR ARCHITECTS OF OUR PARTISAN ERA 12–17 (2018) (recounting the
origins of responsible party government theory).
169. See ROSENFELD, supra note 168, at 17–21 (discussing early critics of the responsible
parties thesis); id. at 279 (describing later criticism by political scientist Nelson Polsby).
170. See, e.g., SUZANNE DOVI, THE GOOD REPRESENTATIVE 69 (2012) (“Perhaps the most
common and important standard used to evaluate the behavior of representatives is the standard
of constituents’ interests.”).
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systematic. By asking about swing voter behavior in the aggregate, we
can begin to form views about whether institutional designers should
seek to empower or disempower swing voters.
In the judicial context, there is fierce disagreement about how
judges should decide hard constitutional171 and statutory172 questions.
Even absent a comprehensive theory of judging, however, a more
modest set of principles can allow for the evaluation of judges, including
judicial swing voters. Judges should set out rules and rationales in ways
that can be understood by other courts, the litigants, and the public at
large.173 They should not rest their decisions on unsupported or outright
false empirical premises. They should engage in “principled decision
making,” which requires that “case-specific judgments should
yield to demands for the consistent application of sound
interpretive principles.”174
Some swing voters might perform better than their colleagues
on these metrics, while others might perform worse. Many
commentators have described the distinctive jurisprudence of recent
swing Justices on the Supreme Court: some have praised their
moderation and constitutional vision, while others have criticized them
for decisionmaking that was analytically undisciplined, empirically
ungrounded, or insufficiently devoted to precedent.175 Beyond the
individual-level traits of particular Justices, political scientists have
provided some evidence that swing Justices might behave differently

171. Disagreement exists about the relative weight to be given to original meaning, structure,
precedent, and evolving social norms. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE:
THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 3–119 (1982) (discussing these and other modalities of
constitutional decisionmaking).
172. On different approaches to statutory interpretation, see, for example, HENRY M. HART,
JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION
OF LAW (1958); ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014); and Antonin Scalia, CommonLaw Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the
Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 9–37
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
173. Cf. FULLER, supra note 166, at 38–39 (laying out eight ways in which law can fail,
including by failing to make prospective rules, be transparent to parties and the public, and make
rules understandable).
174. FALLON, supra note 162, at 18. Fallon describes the point in terms of a moral requirement
of “good faith in argumentation and consistency in the application of legal norms.” See id. at 130.
He does, however, note that because an overly rigid interpretive approach “might yield intolerably
unjust or practically disastrous outcomes in some cases . . . the Justices should approach the
occasions of constitutional decisionmaking with a provisional commitment to interpretive
methodological principles” and that interpretive commitments should be open to revision through
a process of reflective equilibrium. Id. at 126.
175. See, e.g., Did Anthony Kennedy Just Destroy His Own Legacy?, POLITICO MAG. (June
27, 2018), https://politico.com/magazine/story/2018/06/27/anthony-kennedy-legacy-supreme-court218900 [https://perma.cc/CQ3K-TG5F] (collecting a range of perspectives on Justice
Kennedy’s legacy).

132

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:1:85

from other sorts of Justices as a more general matter. One empirical
study finds that swing Justices are more attentive than their colleagues
to public opinion176—a trait that could be either a virtue or a vice
depending on one’s views about the proper role of public opinion in
judicial decisionmaking. In short, evaluating judicial swing voters
requires both an empirical grasp of how they differ from their colleagues
and a normative theory of how judges should behave.
A similar dynamic holds in legislatures. No consensus exists on
who legislators should be responsive to and how they should mediate
between competing demands on them.177 In deciding whether to support
or oppose proposed legislation, some legislators might seek to do what
is best for their constituencies, while others might seek to advance the
national interest. Legislators might put more or less weight on public
opinion in making decisions. And legislators might bring to bear any
number of principles on how they approach policy questions.
Reasonable observers can disagree about the relative weight of these
various duties. As a result, fully evaluating a swing voter’s actions may
require taking positions on hard questions about legislators’ duties.
Consider the common case of a swing legislator who exploits their
position to secure geographically particularized benefits not available
to other legislators. Such a legislator may be admirably advocating for
their constituents or may be wrongly putting their constituents ahead
of the public good. The choice between these two perspectives
necessarily rests on a theory of legislative representation.
Despite the room for reasonable disagreement about legislators’
duties, recent scholarship has proposed principles by which all
legislators should abide, and that should be widely acceptable to those
holding different policy views.178 That work has emphasized the duties
of majorities to consult with minorities; the duties of minorities to seek
to make the government work (rather than just obstruct); and the
duties of all legislators to seek to advance the public good, communicate
with constituents, exercise opinion leadership, and follow constitutional
norms.179 Some swing voters may be more successful than their
colleagues when judged on these metrics, while others might be less
176. See Peter K. Enns & Patrick C. Wohlfarth, The Swing Justice, 75 J. POL. 1089 (2013)
(showing that in closely divided cases, only swing Justices’ votes are correlated with
public opinion).
177. This paragraph’s examples of the various duties that legislators plausibly have are
discussed at greater length in Gould, supra note 144, Section I.A.
178. See Vicki C. Jackson, Pro-Constitutional Representation: Comparing the Role Obligations
of Judges and Elected Representatives in Constitutional Democracy, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1717
(2016); Neil S. Siegel, After the Trump Era: A Constitutional Role Morality for Presidents and
Members of Congress, 107 GEO. L.J. 109 (2018).
179. See Jackson, supra note 178, at 1758–68; Siegel, supra note 178, at 146–54.
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successful. Even the same swing voter might deserve mixed reviews:
they may, for example, score better than partisans for trying to make
government work rather than obstructing, while at the same time
extracting district-specific concessions that run contrary to the public
good. Evaluating swing legislators, like swing judges, requires a rich
descriptive account of how they behave, to be measured against a
normative account of how they should behave.
E. Majority Rule
The value of majority rule provides a final way of assessing
swing voter power. Majority rule is the most common decisionmaking
procedure in legislatures180 and on multimember courts.181 Democratic
theorists have developed several accounts of majority rule’s benefits.182
If swing voter power were either required by or incompatible with
majority rule, that fact would counsel either in favor of or against swing
voter power.
Principles of majority rule yield a mixed verdict on swing voter
power: swing voter power seems consistent with or even required by
majority rule when swing voters join existing blocs on the left or the
right, but in tension with majority rule when swing voters force
outcomes not favored by other voters.
To see why, imagine a hypothetical swing voter in a body with
left and right blocs that makes decisions based on principles of majority
rule. The swing voter’s preferences are, by definition, distant from those
of their nearest neighbors. Each bloc has a first-choice outcome that it
strongly supports, and each bloc strongly opposes the other bloc’s firstchoice outcome. The swing voter has its own first-choice outcome, which
is also each bloc’s second-choice outcome. The swing voter may be
indifferent as between the two blocs’ preferred outcomes or

180. “What it means for a bill to ‘pass’ the House or Senate . . . is constitutionally fixed by the
implicit majority-rule meaning of ‘passed.’” Jed Rubenfeld, Rights of Passage: Majority Rule in
Congress, 46 DUKE L.J. 73, 83 (1996). Subnational legislative bodies likewise typically operate by
majority rule for ordinary legislation, though some require a supermajority for certain types of
legislation (such as tax increases). See Kim Rueben & Megan Randall, Supermajority Budget and
Tax Rules: How Voting Requirements Affect Budgets, URB. INST. (Nov. 2017), https://urban.org/
sites/default/files/publication/94936/supermajority-budget-and-tax-rules_5.pdf [https://perma.cc/
V2CZ-QCBX].
181. For theoretical treatments, see Jeremy Waldron, Five to Four: Why Do Bare Majorities
Rule on Courts?, 123 YALE L.J. 1692 (2014) and Guha Krishnamurthi, For Judicial
Majoritarianism, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1201 (2020).
182. See, e.g., MAJORITY DECISIONS: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES (Jon Elster & Stéphanie
Novak eds., 2014); ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 138–44 (1989); Kenneth O. May,
A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision, 20
ECONOMETRICA 680 (1952); Mathias Risse, Arguing for Majority Rule, 12 J. POL. PHIL. 41 (2004).
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to implement majority rule, Outcome S could never prevail over the
other two outcomes.184 Majority rule need not require, in short, that the
swing voter’s preference prevail. To the contrary, rules that allow a
swing voter to force the adoption of Outcome S may be viewed as in
tension with majority rule, since the preferences of one voter prevail
over those of n voters. And this happens not once but twice: the swing
voter’s preferred outcome prevails over the preferred outcome of the n
members to their left and that of the n members to their right.
*

*

*

It is not possible, in sum, to declare swing voters as a universally
good or bad feature of multimember decisionmaking bodies. This Part
has, however, tried to unearth the values that are at stake in
discussions of swing voter power. Any evaluation of swing voters is
downstream from a host of thorny empirical and normative issues: the
roles of moderation and stability, specific institutional contexts and the
role moralities that should govern in those contexts, and principles of
majority rule. Tempting as it may be to pronounce judgment on swing
voters without settling these other issues, there is no way to judge
swing voters in a vacuum.
V. SWING VOTERS IN A POLARIZED AGE
A. Polarization and Congress
Partisan polarization is a defining feature of contemporary U.S.
politics.185 Congress has witnessed “historic and ever-increasing levels
of party polarization in recent decades, with Republican legislators
increasingly conservative and Democratic legislators increasingly
184. Under Hare voting, each voter identifies their first choice among various options, the
option identified by the fewest voters as their first choice is eliminated, and this process is repeated
as many times as necessary until a single victor emerges. Id. at 147. Hare voting gives significant
weight to voters’ first choices, such that an option that is the first choice of few or no voters cannot
prevail. See id. at 149–50. I do not endorse Hare voting or any other specific voting rule for courts,
legislatures, or other institutions, but the existence of Hare voting shows that principles of
majority rule do not straightforwardly require that Outcome S prevail.
185. The large literature on polarization includes SOLUTIONS TO POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN
AMERICA (Nathaniel Persily ed., 2015); GOVERNING IN A POLARIZED AGE: ELECTIONS, PARTIES, AND
POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN AMERICA (Alan S. Gerber & Eric Schickler eds., 2016); POLITICAL
POLARIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS (Daniel J. Hopkins & John Sides eds., 2015); 1 RED AND BLUE
NATION? CHARACTERISTICS AND CAUSES OF AMERICA’S POLARIZED POLITICS (Pietro S. Nivola &
David W. Brady eds., 2006); 2 RED AND BLUE NATION? CONSEQUENCES AND CORRECTION OF
AMERICA’S POLARIZED POLITICS (Pietro S. Nivola & David W. Brady eds., 2008); ROSENFELD, supra
note 168; BARBARA SINCLAIR, PARTY WARS: POLARIZATION AND THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL POLICY
MAKING (2006); SEAN M. THERIAULT, PARTY POLARIZATION IN CONGRESS (2008).
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liberal.”186 Many observers, both inside and outside the academy, have
lamented the effects of this polarization on U.S. democracy.187
Some might view empowering moderate legislators—including
swing voters—as an antidote to this polarization.188 But this view
ignores the context in which legislative swing voters have emerged and
exercised power: most notably, the shift from the low polarization of the
mid-twentieth century to the high polarization of contemporary politics.
As the parties moved leftward and rightward,189 the few legislators who
remained closer to the center of the ideological distribution at times had
the chance to play the role of swing voters. Recall that the definition of
a swing voter is a pivotal voter with considerable ideological distance
from their nearest neighbors. It is no surprise that a decline in the
number of centrists overall—the emptying out of the middle of the
ideological distribution—created the opportunity for swing voters
to emerge.
This analysis allows for tentative predictions about the future of
legislative swing voters. Swing voters might well have staying power in
Congress, but their existence depends on two political conditions. The
first is a relatively even electoral match between the two parties. A
defining feature of the Congresses of the late twentieth and early
twenty-first centuries is the two parties competing roughly at parity
with one another. Changes in party control of the House and Senate
have been frequent, and majority parties often have held their
chambers only by narrow margins.190 The second condition is
polarization. Both parties face at least as much pressure from the flanks
186. Daniel J. Moskowitz, Jon C. Rogowski & James M. Snyder, Jr., Parsing Party
Polarization in Congress 1 (July 9, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://scholar.harvard.edu/
files/rogowski/files/npat-paper-july2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/4NXE-DULX].
187. See, e.g., Nathaniel Persily, Introduction to SOLUTIONS TO POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN
AMERICA, supra note 185, at 3 (arguing that polarization accounts for “an inability to pass muchneeded and widely supported policies” and describing the “separation-of-powers system [a]s
uniquely threatened by polarization”).
188. See, e.g., Robin Toner, Southern Democrats’ Decline Is Eroding the Political Center, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 15, 2004), https://nytimes.com/2004/11/15/politics/southern-democrats-decline-iseroding-the-political-center.html [https://perma.cc/N895-LA3G]; Pam Belluck, A G.O.P. Breed
Loses Its Place in New England, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2006), https://nytimes.com/2006/11/27/us/
politics/27repubs.html [https://perma.cc/PNF3-YPCE].
189. Polarization is highly asymmetric, however, with Republicans having moved considerably
further to the right than Democrats have to the left. See, e.g., Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson,
Confronting Asymmetric Polarization, in SOLUTIONS TO POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN AMERICA,
supra note 185, at 59–60.
190. See MORRIS P. FIORINA, UNSTABLE MAJORITIES: POLARIZATION, PARTY SORTING, AND
POLITICAL STALEMATE 10 (2017) (noting that in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries,
“twelve elections have produced six different patterns of majority control of our three national
elective institutions,” a degree of instability not witnessed since the nineteenth century); FRANCES
E. LEE, INSECURE MAJORITIES: CONGRESS AND THE PERPETUAL CAMPAIGN 1–5, 15–17 (2016)
(discussing the effects of parties that increasingly compete at rough parity with one another).
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of their respective caucuses—which have been emboldened in recent
years—as they do from their more moderate members.191 Extreme
primary electorates have led to the defeat of some moderate
members.192 Parties still sometimes run more moderate candidates,
especially in states or districts that favor the other party,193 but the
number of moderates in Congress is smaller than it once was.
Together, parity and polarization enable the emergence of
legislative swing voters. If margins of party control were larger, the
pivotal voter might be a loyal partisan—allowing the majority party to
enact its agenda without having to rely on a more moderate pivotal
voter. Similarly, if there were many moderate members, no single one
of them would hold as much power as did Senate swing voters in recent
years. Narrow margins of control and few moderates allow swing voters
to emerge. There is little evidence that legislative polarization will
reverse itself in the near future, but if it does, dynamics around swing
voters will change. It is somewhat more likely that the parties stop
competing at parity and one party or the other gains a more secure
legislative majority. If this were to occur, as it has in many state
legislative chambers, swing voters would become less common.
B. Polarization and the Supreme Court
Like Congress, the Supreme Court has witnessed steadily
growing polarization. For the first time in U.S. history, every Justice
nominated by a Republican president is ideologically to the right of
every Justice nominated by a Democratic president.194 Some have
contended that this sort of polarization—and the related phenomenon
of a Court without a swing voter—threatens the Court’s legitimacy.195
So too, as the Court likely turns rightward in the coming years, some
progressives might become nostalgic for Justices O’Connor and
191. See RUTH BLOCH RUBIN, BUILDING THE BLOC: INTRAPARTY ORGANIZATION IN THE U.S.
CONGRESS 225–94 (2017) (discussing the roles of liberal and conservative hardliners in the
Democratic and Republican parties, respectively).
192. See David W. Brady, Hahrie Han & Jeremy C. Pope, Primary Elections and Candidate
Ideology: Out of Step with the Primary Electorate?, 32 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 79 (2007); Andrew B. Hall,
What Happens When Extremists Win Primaries?, 109 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 18 (2015).
193. See, e.g., Ella Nilsen & Dylan Scott, The Silent Majority of Democratic House Freshmen,
VOX (Jan 27, 2019, 10:05 AM EST), https://vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/1/23/18183636/
congress-2019-new-members-moderates [https://perma.cc/K73Y-FK8X].
194. See, e.g., Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party Polarization Turned
the Supreme Court into a Partisan Court, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 301, 301 (“Since 2010 . . . all of the
Republican-nominated Justices on the Supreme Court have been to the right of all of its
Democratic-nominated Justices. This pattern is . . . unique in the Court’s history. Before 2010, the
Court never had clear ideological blocs that coincided with party lines.”).
195. See supra notes 158–162 and accompanying text.
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Kennedy. While conservative in many respects, the argument
will go, at least they were swing voters who at times broke with
conservative orthodoxy.
The simplest reason for the lack of a Supreme Court swing voter
is that there is not currently a narrow 5–4 division on the Court, leaving
little room for Justices to play the type of decisive role that Justices
O’Connor and Kennedy once played.196 But a deeper dynamic is at work
as well. The parties’ vetting of judicial nominees has become ever-more
sophisticated. In replacing Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, both
Republican appointees from the 1980s, Republicans in the early twentyfirst century sought to appoint loyal conservatives rather than new
swing voters.197 More broadly, over the past three decades both parties
have succeeded in their efforts to nominate and confirm only Justices
who will vote in accordance with the party line in most if not all highprofile cases.198 Unless this changes, there is little reason to think that
a new swing voter will emerge on the Court.
The absence of a swing voter on the Supreme Court is especially
striking given that the Court’s structure and procedures provide fertile
ground for the emergence of powerful swing voters. If one sought to
design an institution that was maximally friendly to swing voters, one
would likely design something that looks very much like the Supreme
Court. The ways in which the institutional design of the Supreme Court
stack the deck in favor of swing voters is instructive as to what lessons
we should draw from either the presence or the absence of a
swing Justice.
For each of the determinants of swing voters’ presence and
power described in Part III, the Supreme Court lies on the pro-swing
voter side of the ledger. The Court’s composition lends itself to longterm swing voters. With nine members, the Court is smaller than

196. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
197. See AMANDA HOLLIS-BRUSKY, IDEAS WITH CONSEQUENCES: THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY AND
THE CONSERVATIVE COUNTERREVOLUTION 154–55 (2014); Jeffrey Toobin, The Conservative
Pipeline to the Supreme Court, NEW YORKER (Apr. 10, 2017), https://newyorker.com/magazine/
2017/04/17/the-conservative-pipeline-to-the-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/9LP3-XGYT].
198. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED
THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 374 (2009) (“Only recently
have Presidents become so single-mindedly focused on the ideology of their appointees . . . .”). The
last appointee to the Supreme Court who regularly voted differently than other Justices appointed
by presidents of the same party was Justice David Souter, who was appointed by a Republican
president in 1990. Justice Souter’s voting pattern led many Republicans to adopt “no more Souters”
as a mantra to guide future appointments. See Linda Greenhouse, David H. Souter:
Justice Unbound, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2009), https://nytimes.com/2009/05/03/weekinreview/
03greenhouse.html [https://perma.cc/7CWM-GAEW]. One result of changes in the appointment
process is that most high-profile Supreme Court decisions feature voting patterns that accord with
the party of the appointing president. See Devins & Baum, supra note 194, at 316–17.

2021]

RETHINKING SWING VOTERS

139

virtually all legislative bodies, many other nations’ supreme courts,199
and all but one of the federal courts of appeals.200 The Constitution
provides for life tenures for federal judges, including Supreme Court
Justices,201 an entitlement that distinguishes the federal judicial
system from nearly all state and national high courts.202 The result of
this structure is a remarkable level of stability: the Court has at times
gone a full decade without any change in its membership.203
When there are changes in the Supreme Court’s membership,
those changes often do nothing to change the Court’s median voter—
and therefore do not dislodge a swing voter, if one exists. When one
right-of-median Justice replaces another (as occurred in 2005 and 2017)
or when one left-of-median Justice replaces another (as occurred in
2009 and 2010), the identity of the Court’s median voter does not
change. The identity of the median voter only changes when the median
voter leaves the Court (as occurred in 2006 and 2018), or if a Justice
from one side of the ideological spectrum replaces one from the other
(as occurred in 2020). The relative rarity of these sorts of changes
allowed swing voters like Justices O’Connor and Kennedy to maintain
their status as swing voters for long periods of time.
The Supreme Court’s decisional procedures also enhance swing
voter power. Unlike many other nations’ high courts,204 the Supreme

199. Despite all but one of the world’s democracies being less populous than the United States,
many have larger supreme courts. See, e.g., Constitutional Reform Act 2005, pt. 3, § 23(2) (UK),
https://legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/4/part/3 [https://perma.cc/2XLQ-DSEF] (twelve judges on
the U.K. supreme court); Bundesverfassungsgerichts-Gesetz [BVERFGE] [Law on the Federal
Constitutional Court], Mar. 12 1951, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, TEIL I [BGBL I] at 1473, § 2 (Ger.),
https://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=221 [https://perma.cc/98X7-KHKR] (sixteen judges on
the German supreme court).
200. Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., Chronological History of Authorized Judgeships—Courts
of Appeals, U.S. CTS., https://uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/authorized-judgeships/chronologicalhistory-authorized-judgeships-courts-appeals (last visited Dec. 27, 2020) [https://perma.cc/F8EK5PAL].
201. Subject only to the requirement of “good Behaviour.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 2.
202. In every state except one, state supreme court justices serve a fixed term ranging from
six to fourteen years. See State Supreme Courts, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/State_
supreme_courts (last visited Oct. 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/JFT3-E5G4]. Some state supreme
courts have mandatory retirement ages as well. E.g., N.H. CONST., pt. 2, art. 78 (mandatory
retirement age of seventy); MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. III, art. I (same). Justices on many nations’
supreme courts are subject to fixed term lengths, mandatory retirement, or both. See, e.g.,
Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, CP, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF]
05-02-1917, últimas reformas DOF 08-05-2020, art. 94 (fifteen-year terms); India Const. art. 124,
cl. 2 (mandatory retirement at age sixty-five).
203. In the most recent long period of stability, the Court’s composition was
unchanged from 1994 to 2005. Justices 1789 to Present, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S.,
https://supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx (last visited Oct. 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/
XL4Z-AXUQ].
204. See supra note 121 (citing sources).
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Court decides cases en banc rather than sitting in panels.205 Unlike
many state supreme courts,206 the Supreme Court has a policy of
discretionary opinion assignment: the most senior Justice in the
majority assigns the opinion.207 And the Supreme Court’s Marks rule
allows an opinion to become the law of the land even if it represents the
view of only one Justice.208 Each of these features of Supreme Court
procedure represents a choice. While none were implemented with the
intention of empowering swing voters, each has that effect.
The same holds for the lack of any other power center on the
Supreme Court to counterbalance a swing voter. Neither the Chief
Justice nor any other Justice has the power over agendas or outcomes
that a party leader or committee chair has in Congress. The only formal
power of the Chief Justice or senior Justice in the majority is the power
to assign the majority opinion, but that power is blunted by the fact that
a savvy swing voter can condition their joining the majority on their
writing the majority opinion. The various other carrots and sticks that
party leaders and committee chairs wield in Congress are absent on the
Court. Without a competing power center, the swing voter’s power is at
its height.
These institutional features collectively tilt the playing field in
favor of swing voters existing and exercising power on the Supreme
Court. When swing voters exist on the Court, then, we should not
regard them as natural or as a function only of ideological factors.
Instead, they are largely a consequence of the Court’s structure and
rules. But when the Court lacks a swing voter, as it does now and will
likely continue to in the near future, the reason does stem from
ideological factors. Given the many institutional variables oriented
toward creating and empowering swing voters, the current absence of a
swing voter on the Court not only reflects the Court’s increased
polarization—it understates the extent of that polarization. If the Court
were structured differently or used different procedures, swing voters
might have been less important than they were in recent decades. If
swing voter power indeed wanes on the Court, it will be because the
realities of polarization have finally caught up with an institutional
deck that was long stacked in swing voters’ favor.
205. While the Supreme Court never sits in multi-Justice panels, individual Justices do decide
certain issues. See William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J.L.
& LIBERTY 1 (2015); Daniel M. Gonen, Judging in Chambers: The Powers of a Single Justice of the
Supreme Court, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1159 (2008).
206. See supra note 124.
207. Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., Supreme Court Procedures, U.S. CTS.,
https://uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/
activity-resources/supreme-1 (last visited Dec. 27, 2020) [https://perma.cc/BG76-TUGB].
208. See supra notes 125–126 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
More than seven decades ago, a note in a leading law review
observed that the swing voter on the Supreme Court received less
attention than his more well-known colleagues.209 No longer. Swing
voters dominated public discourse about the Court from the 1970s to
the 2010s. Changes in the Court’s composition have led some observers
to seek to anoint a new swing voter210 and others to worry about what
it would mean for the Court to lack a swing voter altogether.211 In
Congress, swing voters (when they exist) are showered with attention
from party leaders and members of the media. They are often viewed as
heroes or villains, but rarely in neutral terms. In both courts and
legislatures, swing voters garner attention on account of the
tremendous power they can exercise—despite their formally having the
same voting power as their colleagues.
The public discourse on swing voters has rarely interrogated
why they emerge and why they wield power in the first instance. Swing
voters are not a fact of nature. They are a function of a certain
distribution of preferences among the members of a decisionmaking
body. Ideology alone does not explain swing voter power, however.
Instead, understanding that power requires close examination of the
institutional details that govern how courts and legislatures operate.
Even features of institutions that seem unrelated to swing voters, like
opinion assignment procedures in courts and amendment rules in
legislatures, can shape swing voter power. A study of these and other
determinants of swing voter power makes clear how institutional rules
of many sorts together construct swing voter power.
Our polarized age will likely witness continued nostalgia for
swing voters. This will be especially true among those out of power, who
view loyal bloc voting by their ideological adversaries as a sign that
something is amiss. But arguments about swing voters are often proxies

209. See Mr. Justice Reed — Swing Man or Not?, supra note 38, at 714–15.
210. Following Justice Kennedy’s retirement, many commentators began referring to Chief
Justice Roberts as the Court’s new swing voter. See, e.g., Lawrence Hurley, U.S. Chief Justice’s
‘Swing’ Role Shown in Census, Gerrymandering Rulings, REUTERS (June 27, 2019,
5:20 PM), https://reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-chiefjustice/us-chief-justices-swing-role-shownin-census-gerrymandering-rulings-idUSKCN1TS3A4 [https://perma.cc/G8H7-93JC]; Christopher
Ingraham, Chief Justice John Roberts Is Now the Supreme Court’s Swing Vote, WASH. POST (June
27, 2018, 3:26 PM), https://washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/06/27/chief-justice-johnroberts-is-now-the-supreme-courts-swing-vote [https://perma.cc/P2YQ-VKXV]; Tom McCarthy,
John Roberts Is Now Supreme Court’s Swing Vote—To Conservatives’ Disdain, GUARDIAN
(June 30, 2020, 10:58 AM), https://theguardian.com/law/2020/jun/30/john-roberts-supreme-courtconservatives [https://perma.cc/4W4A-L77R].
211. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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for arguments about something else. Claims about swing voters may in
fact be claims about polarization, moderation, or stability in democratic
institutions. The presence, absence, or power of swing voters is best
understood not as important for its own sake, but rather as a useful
window into important features of how our democratic institutions
are performing.

